








MANAGING POST-MERGER CORPORATE CULTURE: 





SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
in partial fulfillment if the requirements for the 
degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
By 













All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
    unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest Information and Learning Company 
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
     Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 
All rights reserved.
 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. 
  
 
MANAGING POST-MERGER CORPORATE CULTURE: 
A CASE STUDY OF TWO MERGERS IN THE UNITED STATES 
TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY 
 
A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE 















H. D. O’Hair, Ph.D.
Committee Chair 
Joseph Rodgers, Ph.D.
Brigitte Steinheider, Ph.D., MBA
Arthur B. Van Gundy, Ph.D.


























© Copyright by JAMES A. SENESE 2007 






The number and value of mergers and acquisitions involving a United States 
company continue to grow at record rates. The excitement about doing a merger or 
acquisition is driven by the anticipation of financial success due to reduced competition, 
operational synergies, and access to larger customer bases.  The dark side of mergers and 
acquisitions, however, is that two-thirds of them either fail or under perform 
expectations.  Although blame is often placed on financial considerations or unrealistic 
business plans, there has been a recent interest in how the human side of mergers and 
acquisitions may affect their ultimate success.  
One topic often disregarded when a merger is planned is how the corporate 
cultures of the two companies will react with each other when the companies are brought 
together.  Since every organization has a unique culture, it is possible that the two 
cultures could clash and undermine the benefits of the merger by reducing productivity, 
disrupting operations, disturbing the supply chain,  or alienating customers.  
This dissertation examines and discusses – in case study format – the different 
approach the leadership of two organizations took to manage corporate culture in their 
transportation industry mergers. 
One company proactively sought to recognize and adopt the best cultural 
characteristics of both pre-merger partners. The other company chose to rapidly integrate 
two competitors with an expectation that the culture of the acquired organization would 
be assimilated into the culture of the new owner.  
Using descriptors coined by Harrison and Stokes in 1992, the first case study 




a competitor that had a support culture.  According to senior management, both cultures 
contributed to the financial success of the predecessor companies.  With the approaching 
merger, however, the leadership team recognized that a clash of the different values, 
attitudes, and driving forces could be detrimental to the new company. 
The second case studies the merger of two competitors that sought to build a 
larger end-to-end network.  Using the Harrison and Stokes (1992) descriptors, the 
acquired company in this example had an achievement type culture while the acquiring 
company had and still has a role type culture.  In this case the post-merger culture change 
(P. M. C. C.) methodology consisted simply of requiring that the acquired company adopt 
the rules and practices of the acquiring company.  
The creation of these case studies has contributed to the body of knowledge by 
providing the rationale, results, and consequences that might be analogous to other 
organizations considering a post-merger culture change.  The two mergers selected for 
this research represent the extreme ends of the change spectrum.  The case studies were 
written based on 23 personal interviews with current and previous employees in a range 
of positions at both companies. The research also relies heavily on document 
examination, reference to published materials, and observations of the companies in their 
natural setting. 
The post-merger culture change (P.M.C.C.) at one company relied on the 
identification and adoption of best practices from both predecessor companies.  That 
merger has been declared to be successful by senior management based on levels of 




In the second case, no underlying development strategy was used to guide the 
process. Operating problems attributable to the disregard of job skills developed within 
months. Many employees who resisted were given an exit opportunity causing a 
knowledge deficit in territories germane to the acquired company.  Severe and costly 
service disruptions resulted which took years for the company to recover from. 
Since no two mergers are alike, this case study research provides information that 
may be of value to those considering a merger or acquisition.  Merger participants should 
take into account such factors as the workforce size, geographical distribution, strength of 
collective bargaining agreements, and tenure of employees when making post-merger 
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Glossary of Terms 
 
 
 Acquisition     When a company takes over another one and clearly becomes 
the new owner.  From a legal point of view, the target company ceases to exist 
and stock of the buyer continues to be traded. 
 Chemical Coast The waterfront along the Gulf of Mexico that stretches from 
Galveston, Texas, to New Orleans, Louisiana. Site of many chemical and 
petroleum industries. 
 Corporate Culture     Those shared attitudes and beliefs that give the members 
of an organization a sense of identity and rules for behavior. Group culture is 
formally defined as: 
“A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved 
its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has 
worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to 
new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to 
those problems.”  (Schein, 1992, p. 12) 
 Consolidation   A merger when the two firms are approximately the same size  
 
(Gaughan, 2002). Only one corporation survives and the merged corporations 
no longer exist. 
 Grainger  A railroad, usually in the mid-west, that primarily hauls corn or dry 




 Intermodal  Cargo that is shipped in containers over multiple modes of 
transportation.  For example, containers taken from ocean-going ships and 
loaded onto railcars. 
 Merger      The combination of equals (Beitler, 2003). When two firms, often 
about the same size, agree to go forward as a new single company rather than 
be separately owned and operated. 
 Organizational Climate (as opposed to Organizational Culture)  Often 
confused but very different.  Climate is defined as the perceived quality of the 
internal environment.  Although subjective in nature, its properties can be 
quantified by members of the organization through surveys and polls. 
“Changing climate is easier and faster than changing culture” (Stringer, 2002, 
p. 16). 
 P. M. C. C.  (Post-Merger Culture Change) This researcher’s term for 
activities following a merger or acquisition intended to define the 
organizational culture of the new company. Post-merger culture change is also 
referred to as acculturation (Nahavandi, 1993). 
 Reverse Merger   The gradual undoing of a merger – similar to what is going 
on today with AOL / Time Warner. (Frank, 2002). The rationale behind a 
spin-off or “carve-out” is that the parts are greater than the whole. Reverse 
mergers may be required due to anti-trust or other judicial findings (such as 
with the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific’s first merger that was reversed in 
1913. 





enterprises that are organized for the purpose of moving freight or people.  
 
 Types of Mergers:  Horizontal: the combination of two companies that are in 
direct competition in the same product lines and markets.  Vertical: the 
combination of two companies that have either a supplier and company 
relationship or a customer and company relationship.  Market Extension:  The 
combination of two companies that sell the same product in different markets.  
Product Extension: The combination of two companies that sell different 




RATIONALE, SIGNIFICANCE AND NEED FOR STUDY 
Popularity of Mergers as a Form of Strategic Alliance 
 
 Managers who are faced with uncertain environments often consider strategic 
alliances to control costs, supplies, competitors or customers.  One such form of strategic 
alliance is merger and acquisition, a legal process where one company purchases or 
combines with another to become an entity that shares resources, technologies and 
profits.  Some distinct advantages to mergers or acquisitions are the immediate access to 
the resources of both companies and a reduction in competition.  Offsetting these are the 
disadvantages of typically costly and risky implementation, a potential decline in 
productivity, and a lack of focus on the organization’s primary business (Nahavandi & 
Malekzadeh, 1993). Mergers in recent years, also, have been frequently used as a way for 
companies to increase their domestic or global presence.  The current marketplace has 
been characterized by a number of highly publicized multibillion dollar International 
deals intended to expand the global reach of the participating organizations (Ashkenas, 
Ulrich, Jick & Kerr, 2002). 
Merger and Acquisition Selection Criteria 
 
 Merger and acquisition selection decisions are dominated by financial and 
strategic factors.  Strategic factors commonly cited in the transportation industry include 
the desire to obtain routes, destinations, or operating locations in an accelerated fashion.  
The valuation of the target company and the potential for synergy are key considerations. 
“As mergers and acquisitions have traditionally tended to remain essentially private 
corporate events, with no effective model to draw from, acquiring management seems set 
  1
  
to continue to make the same mistakes”(Cartwright & Cooper, 1996, p. 25). A high 
proportion of mergers and acquisitions end up in financial failure or, at best, 
underperforming expectations. Not surprisingly, when a merger fails, rational financial 
and economic issues are usually blamed (e.g. economies of scale were not achieved; the 
strategic fit was poor; or there were unexpected changes in market conditions). When 
reasons for lack of success of a merger are discussed, the focus is often on the financial 
and strategic issues. Infrequently, some “people” issues – such as conflicting corporate 
cultures – are named as contributing factors. Beitler (2003) said the “… reasons for M & 
A failure include paying too much, lack of due diligence, unrealistic expectations, 
conflicting corporate cultures and poor strategic planning. (p. 103).  A highly visible 
recent example involves German Daimler-Benz’s merger with U. S. automaker Chrysler 
Corporation.  The deal promised to deliver $3 billion per year through purchasing 
synergies and technology sharing.  Cultural differences and the lack of a clear integration 
plan, however, led the parent company to continue to operate the manufacturers as 
separate business units (Ashkenas, et al, 2002). 
Consideration of the Human Side Frequently Disregarded 
 
 Leaders who arrange for mergers and acquisitions of their organizations often are 
not aware of (or concerned with) the effect the merger has on the culture of the two 
joining companies.  When the management of a company decides to acquire another 
company it usually carefully checks the financial strength, market position, management 
strength, real estate values and various other aspects pertaining to the health of the other 
company.  Ex-Tyco Chief Executive Officer Dennis Kozlowski said, “The main thing 
I’ve learned is that acquisitions work best when the main rationale is cost reduction” 
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(Carey, 1997, p. 5).  Rarely checked are those aspects that might be considered cultural: 
the philosophy or style of the company; its technological origins; its basic assumptions; 
or its beliefs about its mission or its future.  “…a cultural mismatch in an acquisition or 
merger is as great a risk as a financial, product, or market mismatch” (Schein, 1992, p. 
269).  Perception and anticipation of these organizational differences could possibly 
assist in the identification of steps that would improve the likelihood of forming a 
successful business combination. 
Similarly, after a merger of companies, little attention is given to the intentional 
creation of a new corporate culture based on the best parts of both predecessor cultures.  
The creation of a new culture cannot be legislated, is difficult to implement, and can be a 
time-consuming distraction of management attention away from the business needs of the 
company.  Nevertheless, in many situations, a post-merger culture change must occur in 
order for the merger to meet its expectations. Kaplan and Norton (2004) reported that 
corporate culture could be either a barrier or an enabler to success and that making the 
merger a successful strategic fit requires basic changes in the way business is conducted.  
Since strategy is executed through individuals at all levels in the new organization, new 
attitudes and behaviors (culture) will be required throughout the workforce as a 
prerequisite. 
Purpose of this Dissertation 
This dissertation examines and discusses the different approach two companies in 
the transportation industry took to address the post-merger culture of their new 
organizations.  The cases were selected because of what appeared to be different 
underlying principles, style, and processes used in each situation. 
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Rationale for Study 
One of the underlying reasons why mergers and acquisitions often fail to achieve 
the level of operational and financial performance predicted by pro formas and feasibility 
studies is the conflict and tension that emerge when companies try to combine disparate 
and frequently dramatically different cultures (Buono & Bowditch, 1989). 
The purpose of this dissertation research is to facilitate organizations considering 
a merger by revealing the issues the studied organizations addressed regarding the culture 
of their post-merger organization.  In many situations, it is suggested that a post-merger 
culture change would contribute to the likelihood of success of the new business 
combination.  This dissertation identifies the extreme variations of post-merger culture 
change that are possible.  Additionally, the case studies gauge the suitability and success 
of the chosen approach.  A review of the literature reveals that variations of post-merger 
culture change include the creation of a whole new culture, the forced dominance of one 
of the predecessor cultures, or the creation of an environment that allows both cultures to 
co-exist. 
 The need for this study exists for four reasons:  (1) the topic of the influence of 
corporate culture is largely ignored by scholarly literature when considering directions 
and templates for mergers and acquisitions.  (2) There is no effective model for 
considering the human side of mergers and acquisitions to draw from.  (3) There is a need 
to understand if leaders in the case studies recognized an impending culture clash and 
why they chose the post-merger culture change approach they did.  Finally, (4) there is a 
need to understand if the chosen approach met the user’s expectations and if the benefits 
of implementation exceeded the direct and indirect costs. 
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Significance of Study 
This research is significant because it will be available for use by parties 
contemplating a merger or acquisition who are interested in anticipating the 
psychological aspects of their endeavor along with the customarily addressed financial 
and strategic components. Transformational changes are culture-dependent and require a 
focused effort to study the organization’s current culture and clarify its desired culture 
(Ackerman, Anderson, & Anderson, 2001).  Different acquisitions are likely to result in 
different cultural dynamics and potential organizational outcomes.  Hall and Norburn 
(1987) made two observations relating to the culture match between partnering 
organizations.  They concluded that the extent to which there exists a fit between the 
culture of the acquiring organization and the acquired organization will be directly 
correlated to the success of the acquisition.  They also observed that where a lack of fit in 
organizational culture exists, the success of the acquisition is determined by the amount 
of post-acquisition autonomy granted to the acquired organization. 
Similarly, since many transportation companies recently have identified that the 
characteristics of post-combination corporate culture can improve chances of having a 
successful business merger, this dissertation will espouse the methodology and 
effectiveness of two very different cultural manipulation techniques employed.  This will 
be helpful for other business enterprises (transportation or non-transportation industry) to 
learn from and adopt in the correction of undesirable cultural or climatic environments. 
Chapter Summary 
 The number and value of mergers and acquisitions has grown year over year to a 
trillion dollar level worldwide.  This activity, in part, is driven by the anticipation of 
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financial success as a result of having reduced competition and immediate access to each 
company’s resources in a merger situation. 
 Frequently disregarded, however, is the fact that two-thirds of all mergers either 
fail or under perform expectations.  Typically, when this occurs, managers place the 
blame on financial considerations or unrealistic business side expectations.  Only recently 
has there been an interest in how the human side of a merger may affect its eventual 
success.  Accordingly, there appears to be a need for a larger body of knowledge for 
understanding how an impending culture clash can be recognized and what techniques 
can effectively control it. 
 In many situations, it is suggested that a post-merger culture change would 
contribute to the likelihood of success of the new business combination.  Several 
iterations of post-merger culture change are possible, including the creation of a whole 
new culture, the forced dominance of one of the predecessor cultures, or the creation of 
an environment that allows both cultures to co-exist. 
This dissertation research examines the approach taken in two different 
transportation industry mergers that took place over the last decade.  The rationale for 
performing this research is to provide information to facilitate organizations considering 
a merger and a post-merger culture change by revealing the tactics employed in the two 








REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Dissertation Research Perspective 
As shown in Figure 1, this dissertation research has five components.  These are: 
(1) multiple, interactive, structured interviews of selected executives, managers, staff, and 
line employees of the studied companies; (2) opportunistic interviews which manifest 
themselves as a result of the structured interviews; (3) scholarly literature that has been 
searched and cited reflecting what is reported regarding the subjects of business mergers, 
combinations of corporate cultures, and organizational change; (4) industry and popular-
press literature which has been reviewed and cited as it relates to the human or cultural 
element of each particular merger in the sample; and then, (5) personal observations, as a 
practitioner involved with one of the cases.  The interpretation of these five components 
has initiated the development of the research questions listed in the Chapter Three. 
Scholarly Literature – Mergers and Acquisitions 
Merger and Acquisition Trends 
Saying that mergers and acquisitions are wildly popular would not be an 
exaggeration.  In the five years between 1975 and 1980 there were 13,000 mergers and 
acquisitions in the United States of publicly held corporations involving a transaction of 
more than $1 million.  Eight years later, in January 1988 alone – only four months after 
the 1987 stock market crash – more that $16 billion worth of takeover attempts were put 



































Rather than send a signal of caution, the market crash induced additional activity because 
of the “marked-down” status of some firms triggering a market condition currently 
referred to as “merger mania”. Back in the 1980’s it was estimated that 25 per cent of the 
United States workforce had already been affected by merger and acquisition activity.  
McManus and Hergert (1988) projected that at the current pace every public company 
would be under new ownership and/or management by the end of the decade.  Although 
their prediction fell short, the legendary merger mania of the 1980’s pales beside the 
merger activity to come.  In 1998, 10,825 deals involving U. S. companies were 
announced for a total value of $1.36 trillion – the first year the $1 trillion mark was 
exceeded.  Despite a setback following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, merger 
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and acquisition activity has rebounded as shown in Table 1. The $1 trillion mark is 
expected to again be exceeded in 2005.  Thomson Financial projects that the business 
segments which will be most affected in 2005 are technology, manufacturing, and health 
care.  In previous years, among other sectors, mergers have been particularly common 
among railroads and airline companies due to reduced governmental control and the 
desire to establish economies of scale. 
Investment bankers J. P. Morgan reported that companies worldwide spent $3.3 
trillion on mergers and acquisitions in 1999 – a full 32% more than was spent in 1998 
(Ashkenas & Francis, 2000). In addition, new merger and acquisition markets are still 
emerging. Analysts are projecting that Russia will lead with merger and acquisition 
activity in Eastern Europe where the value of mergers jumped from $US 7.5 billion to 
$US 23.7 billion from 2002 to 2003 (Pravda, 2004). 
By the time 2005 was only one and a half months old, eleven mergers worth one 
billion dollars or more each had been made.  The largest of these, Procter & Gamble’s 
purchase of Gillette, is valued at $57 billion.  Two other mergers in the same period, 
SBC’s purchase of A. T. & T. (its ex-parent company) and MetLife’s acquisition of 
Travelers Insurance from Citigroup, were worth another $27 billion. The growth 
continues.  For the first 6 months of 2006, the value of mergers worldwide exceed $1.8 
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Likelihood of a Successful Merger 
Mergers and acquisitions continue to be fashionable despite evidence that 
suggests that a majority of these combinations will fail (Banal-Estanol & Seldeslachts, 
2004). Investopedia reported that roughly two thirds of big mergers would lose value on 
the stock market after the deal is put into play (2004). The likelihood of a merger failing 
is not a new observation or a current trend.  Michael Porter discussed in 1987 that 50 per 
cent of the United States mergers he studied and reported on previously had since 
divested, or reverse-merged (Porter, 1987). USA Today reported that in the period 
between 1980 and 2001, the market value of companies making acquisitions declined by 
$221 billion.  Nevertheless, the merger trend will continue because companies have cash 
(Krantz, 2005).  
Since mergers and acquisitions are not only economic decisions but also social 
processes (Risberg, 2003), the reasons for failure can come from either aspect. Banal-
Estanol and Seldeslachts (2004) say that three things induce merger failures: uncertainty, 
keeping some information private, and potential coordination problems. It is in this last 
category where cultural differences and poor integration efforts lie. 
Similarly, four of the reasons often cited for contributing to the failure of a merger 
are: (1) flawed motivations; (2) unmet economies of scale; (3) cultural incompatibility; 
and (4) disregard of the core business (Investopedia, 2002). 
Reasons Cited for Merger Failures 
Motivation Behind the Merger Decision is Flawed 
Mergers are often an attempt by management to imitate a rival’s big merger.  As 
such, “…the merger may often have more to do with glory seeking [and catching-up] 
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than with business strategy” (Investopedia, 2002, p. 11).  Unfortunately, these forces are 
not dissuaded by the bankers and lawyers who stand to earn large fees from their merger-
focused clients.  Similarly, a merger may also be made out of fear of being acquired by 
another company rather than from a sound business evaluation and a strategic growth 
initiative. 
Elusive Economies of Scale Efficiencies 
As a result of a flawed planning process, ineffective execution, or unanticipated 
obstacles, some cost cuts or anticipated synergies simply just do not happen 
(Investopedia, 2002).  Contributing to this is that all facts may not have been revealed by 
the seller or discovered in the due diligence process. 
Incompatible Corporate Culture 
Whenever two organizations with different principles and operating practices 
combine, there is potential for resentment and hampered productivity due to the changes 
in values and management style.  A sense of resistance to change builds up as well as a 
sense of ambiguity about what everyone’s roles will be. A dyadic winners and losers 
atmosphere develops that creates a negative work environment that could undermine the 
success of the merger (Manjoo, 2002). 
Disregard of the Day-to-Day Business 
Organizational failure can be caused by management spending too much post-
merger time concentrating on cost cutting and integration activities to the detriment of 
running the day-to-day business.  This prompts nervous customers to flee causing 
revenues, and ultimately, profits to suffer.  The loss of revenue momentum is one reason 
“…many mergers fail to create value for shareholders” (Investopedia, 2002, p. 12).  
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Effect of Different Types of Mergers 
In 1989, Buono and Bowditch assessed different types of mergers and 
acquisitions.  Since there are a variety of combination types, a number of different issues 
are raised for the firms’ employees.  These pose problems and possibilities for 
precombination planning and post consolidation integration (Buono & Bowditch, 1989). 
Thus, “…the retention of key employees, the importance of the acquired firms’ human 
resources, and the extent to which people’s concerns are dealt with in an open and 
forthright manner can vary quite considerably depending on the strategic type of merger 
… and the type of synergy desired” (Buono & Bowditch, 1989, p.64). 
 A study published in 2001 concluded that: 
“Mergers are good for business and labor. Ownership changes were associated 
with increases in wages at the typical plant.  However, the typical worker in a 
merger fared more poorly because the negative impacts on wages were highest at 
larger plants where the benefits of restructuring were greatest.” (McGuckin, 2001, 
p. 17) 
This raises the question of which is more likely to affect the success of a merger 
negatively: the fear of lost wages or the mismatch between corporate cultures? 
Another study suggests that not all acquisitions are problem-free, and not all 
problems surface in the planning phase.  According to this study "…it is important to 
examine the two companies' corporate cultures.  When they are …. opposed, post 





Scholarly Literature – Organizational Culture 
Every business organization has a unique corporate culture. “Culture is the frame 
of reference that helps distinguish one group of people from another” (Conner, 1992, p. 
160).  This culture reflects the attitudes and beliefs of the company and is often deep-
seated.  “Overall, organizational cultures are intricate webs of overlapping and 
reinforcing assumptions about how the world works” (Klein, 2004, p. 75).  When blended 
with another company, due to this intricacy, the culture of both may mesh, repel each 
other, or live independently. What is seen in the case of mergers of relative equals is a 
collision of well-established cultures that leads to many culture-related performance 
concerns (Fairfield-Sonn, 2001).  In most cases, “…the problem of blending or 
assimilation is compounded by the fact that the new business unit does not have any 
shared history“(Schein, 1999, p. 173).  Unless actions are taken to create a new corporate 
culture, one usually dominates. 
A moderate body of literature on the subject of corporate culture has been in  
 
existence for the last ten years. Surprisingly, though, most definitions of culture currently 
used in the social sciences are modifications of Tylor’s 1871 definition (Buono & 
Bowditch, 1989).  Tylor defined the concept as that complex whole, which includes 
knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits 
acquired by man as a member of society. 
Literature, both popular and scholarly, on the subject of business mergers and 
acquisitions, however, is more abundant and accessible.  Nonetheless, the question of 
how a managed corporate culture affects the success of a merger is not as prevalent and 
requires primary research. As an illustration of this oversight, the book that is considered 
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among the leading guides to business combinations, Mergers, Acquisitions and 
Corporate Restucturings (3rd Edition), by Patrick A. Gaughan, does not even mention 
corporate culture in its lengthy 600+ page text (Gaughan, 2002). 
 
 
Figure 2.  Difficulty of organizational culture change. 
 
Invisible  Harder to Change 
 Shared Values:  Important concerns 
and goals that are shared by most of 
the people in a group, that tend to 
shape group behavior, and that often 
persist over time even with changes in 
group membership. 
 
   
 Group Behavior Norms: Common or 
pervasive ways of acting that are 
found in a group and that persist 
because group members tend to 
behave in ways that teach these 
practices and values to new members, 
rewarding those that fit in and 
sanctioning those that do not. 
 
Visible  Easier to Change 
 
Note. From Kotter & Heskett, 1992, p.5 
 
 
Similarly, the American Management Association in its six-page Comprehensive 
Checklist for an Acquisition makes no mention of having an awareness of the culture of 
either organization (Bohl, 1989). 
The Nature of Low-Performance Cultures 
 The relationship between corporate culture and long-term economic performance 
can either be positive or negative. Kotter and Heskett (1992) observed some common 
characteristics of companies with cultures associated with excellent performance.  In 
these companies almost all managers share a set of consistent values and methods of 
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doing business.  Similarly, all employees’ goals are in alignment.  In each of these 
companies there was an unusually high level of employee motivation because these 
companies had made work intrinsically rewarding.  Finally, these companies were able to 
provide structure and controls without constructing a formal bureaucracy.   
Kotter and Heskett (1992) also drew some conclusions regarding the development 
of cultures that undermine economic performance.  Their research raises the question of 
how difficult it is to transform those cultures into ones that enhance performance.  Based 
on a sample of 20 companies studied between 1977 and 1988, the researchers determined 
that there were some common characteristics of the organizations that displayed 
unhealthy cultures.  First, managers tended to be arrogant.  Second, managers in these 
cultures tended not to value customers, stockholders, and employees highly.  Third, these 
cultures became hostile to values of leadership because these firms had strong managerial 
orientations. They tend to behave in centralized bureaucratic ways.  The conclusion 
reached by Kotter and Heskett was that there is “…a positive relationship between the 
strength of corporate culture and long-term economic performance … but it is a modest 
relationship” (Kotter & Heskett, 1992, p. 21).  A further perspective raised by the same 
researchers is that the content of a culture, in terms of which values and mores are 
common, may be more important that its strength. 
Cultural Compatibility 
 It would seem that cultural compatibility between combining organizations 
would lead to merger success.  However, research done in the last decade found that the 
combination of dissimilar cultures may be more likely and appropriate. It was found that 
“… cultural similarity is not necessarily a precondition for satisfactory assimilation” 
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(Cartwright & Cooper, 1996, p. 91).  Their research is based on classifying mergers into 
three categories: Open Marriages, Traditional Marriages and Collaborative Marriages. 
Cartwright and Cooper (1996) and Harrison and Stokes (1992) described four general 
types of cultures as Power, Role, Task (Achievement), and Support.  These four culture 
types have as many as ten possible combinations as shown in Figure 3 on page 20. 
Categories of Mergers 
 Open marriages.  This occurs when the acquirer is satisfied with the present 
performance of the acquired organization.  In such circumstances, the acquisition is 
usually considered to represent a purely strategic extension of the acquiring 
organization’s business activities.  In these mergers, the acquiring company sees its role 
as supporting the acquisition and facilitating its growth.  “The essence of the open 
marriage is non-interference, whereby the acquirer is quite happy to allow the acquired 
organization as an autonomous business unit” (Cartwright & Cooper, 1996 p. 77).  
Mergers of this type most often occur in combinations of unrelated businesses.  Two 
conditions are essential for success of this type of merger: a competent management team 
and a forecast for future growth.  An example of an open marriage is bookseller The W. 
H. Smith Group’s acquisition of the Do It All DIY chain (Cartwright & Cooper, 1996 p. 
78). 
 Traditional marriages. These occur when the dominant partner is dissatisfied with 
the present performance of the acquired organization and feels that its role is to redesign 
it.  Radical and wide-scale change techniques are usually employed to force the acquired 
organization to adopt the practices, procedures, philosophy and culture of the acquirer. 
The success of this type of combination depends on the willingness of the acquired 
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partner to assimilate into the culture of the acquiring company.  Difficulties occur when 
the acquired company resists or seeks to renegotiate the terms.  In these cases, the 
acquirer as dominant partner usually responds with career-modification actions including 
termination, early retirement, or reassignment.  An example of a Traditional Marriage is 
the acquisition of the Southern Pacific Railroad by the Union Pacific. 
 Collaborative marriages (a.k.a. Modern marriages). A high deal of respect 
between partners and a genuine recognition that integration will be mutually beneficial 
are characteristics of this type of combinations.  In most situations, collaborative 
marriages identify and implement the best practices of both organizations and seek 
synergies and shared learning between both.  When difficulties arise it is usually because 
participants are slow to recognize the collaborative potential and assume it to be a 
traditional type.  The key to success is the speed with which management diffuses any 
feelings of threat between the two workforces and encourages a cooperative existence. 
An example of a collaborative marriage is the recent combination of Dollar Rent A Car 
and Thrifty Car Rental. 
Culture Types and Permutations  
 Harrison & Stokes and Cartwright & Cooper both published similar definitions of 
culture types in 1992. Cartwright and Cooper, in 1996, expanded their research to 
consider the effect of mergers of organizations with different culture types. 
Power. In this type of organization, the employees are expected to accept that the  
‘boss knows best’.  In power cultures leadership rests on the leader’s ability and 
willingness to administer rewards and punishments.  At its worst, an organization with a 
power culture manages by fear and imposes a high level of restraint on the individual. 
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Successful large companies with a power culture must have good structures and strong 
systems in place for performing their work.   
 Role. These cultures impose less constraint on the individual than power cultures.  
Duties of the employees are clearly defined and often are the subject of implicit or 
explicit contracts between the organization and the individual.  “At its best, the role-
oriented organization provides stability, justice and efficient performance (Harrison & 
Stokes. 1992. p. 15).  The weaknesses of a role culture are its impersonality and the 
barrier to innovation that comes with the loss of employee autonomy.  A merger of a 
power culture company with a role culture company will see considerable resistance to 
change. 
Task (Achievement). Employees of these companies are generally highly satisfied 
and very committed to their organizations. Employees of organizations with this type of 
culture generally enjoy their work and are pleased with the qualitative, intrinsic, rewards 
they receive.  In these companies the work situation engages the person and the 
employees feel they are working for something bigger than themselves.  In some cases 
employees supervise themselves and identify what needs to be done with direction from 
above.  There is a high sense of teamwork and camaraderie among the employees as they 
achieve their common mission or purpose.  Companies with an achievement culture 
evoke enthusiasm and commitment but often lack having a heart (Harrison & Stokes, 
1992). 
Support. Because this culture offers the individual the opportunity for self-
actualization, their members are likely to resist any culture change (Cartwright & Cooper, 
1992).  Support culture is based on mutual trust between the individual and the 
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organization. Some characteristics of support cultures include a high level of company 
and personal communications, harmony and cooperation between employees and work 
groups, and recognition of achievements and celebration of success.  A by-product of the 
support culture is a tendency to “…avoid confrontation sometimes to the point of leaving 
important issues unresolved” (Harrison & Stokes, 1992, p. 20).  On its own, the support 
culture is not results-oriented enough to enable a business to be competitive.  However, 
when merged with a company with an achievement culture, the combination often offsets 
each other’s weaknesses. 
Figure 3. Culture combinations. 
 Power Role Task  
(Achievement)
Support 
Power X X X X 
Role  X X X 
Task   X X 
Support    X 
 
 The possible combinations of these four types of culture are: 
1. Power with Power 
2. Power with Role 
3. Power with Task (Achievement) 
4. Power with Support 
5. Role with Role 
6. Role with Task 
7. Role with Support 
8. Task with Task 
9. Task with Support 
10. Support with Support 
 
Only four of the potential combinations shown in Figure 3 are between similar 
types.  “Traditional marriages almost always lead to such combinations because the 
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acquired company is usually smaller or less successful than its acquirer” (Cartwright & 
Cooper, 1996, p. 80). 
Once the culture types of the combining organizations are identified and 
classified, management must determine the degree of similarity/dissimilarity between 
them.  Based on this, the outcome of the cultural dynamics of the combination are 
potentially predictable and that the culture type before integration is the main determinant 
if an acquired culture will eventually change or integrate. 
Alternative Position 
 Joseph Astrachan adopted a different explanation of the effect of mergers on 
culture.  He developed a theory of separation anxiety that holds that mergers and 
acquisitions raise separation anxiety that, in turn, influences individual feelings and 
behavior (Astrachan, 2004).  Separation anxiety is associated with the frightening 
situation of having a relationship change drastically or end.  His model, which suggests 
that culture is actually defined by the merger, follows a linear pattern.  In a simplified 
version, the news of an impending merger drives separation anxiety (which is affected by 
prior separation experiences).  This forms individual feelings and behaviors that mold 
patterns of group behavior that eventually affects group task work. 
Culture Versus Climate 
  Buono and Bowditch (1989) drew a comparison between the terms Subjective 
Organizational Culture and Organizational Climate.  Organizational Climate is defined as 
whether peoples’ expectations about what it should be like to work in an organization are 
met.  Subjective Organizational Culture, per their description, refers to the nature of 
beliefs and expectations about organizational life.  Climate is a measurement of how well 
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these beliefs are being met.  This adds another dimension to this researcher’s work 
because organizations with different cultures can have similar organizational climates.  
During the process of combining two organizations, the “…cultural collision and 
resulting shock for organizational members created by living in a different organizational 
world can disrupt the entire workings of the newly formed firm” (Buono & Bowditch, 
1989, p. 143).  Since this research is concerned with how both companies managed post-
merger corporate culture – rather than organizational climate – it is important to establish 
and distinguish between the two definitions. 
Summary – Organizational Culture Literature 
Most organizations have a unique and deep-seated set of attitudes and beliefs that 
form the work environment and guide the company’s daily activities and decision-
making processes.  Cultural traits can be visible such as actions that support appropriate 
behavior.  Other traits are invisible such as the shared values of members that persist over 
time even with changes in-group membership. 
Corporate culture has been researched and discussed in literature frequently in the 
last decade.  Literature on business mergers, acquisitions and corporate restructuring is 
more available and accessible.  Nevertheless, research and literature on the cultural 
implications of mergers is lightly treated.  It is known that the associated cultures of both 
companies in a merger may either coexist, be assimilated or be transformed. It is known, 
also, that cultural conflicts may be a contributor to the underperformance and possible 
failure of mergers. 
Kotter and Heskett (1992) drew some conclusions about the development of 
cultures that undermine corporate performance.  They also concluded that there is a 
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relationship between the strength of corporate culture and long-term economic 
performance.  Cartwright and Cooper (1996) suggested that there is a greater probability 
of dissimilar cultures coming together in a merger than similar cultures.  By evaluating 
and understanding the cultures of both organizations they suggest that the outcome of the 
cultural dynamics of the combination are predictable and that the culture type before 
integration is the main determinant if an acquired culture will eventually change or 
integrate. 
An alternative point of view is raised by Astrachan (2004).  His model suggests 
that culture is actually defined by separation anxiety associated with the merger. 
Scholarly Literature – Organizational Change 
 Organizational change, the transformation of the way an enterprise functions, 
occurs on a continual basis.  Much of this falls into the category of modifying work 
processes, correcting and adjusting staffing levels or improving or discontinuing product 
lines.  Some change is mandated by external forces which are defined as those which are 
triggered by changes in the external environment including social trends, political forces, 
new competitors and customer demands.  Others are driven by internal forces that could 
include low customer or employee satisfaction, low performance, having a new mission, 
or acquiring new leadership (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1999). 
 Some changes happen slowly and affect the organization gradually.  However, 
other changes are more sudden and fast paced.  Gradual, incremental change could be 
described as evolutionary where the stages of change are hardly discernable by the 
employees.  “Planned evolutionary or convergent change is the result of a specific and 
conscious action to make changes in an organization” (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1999, 
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p. 497).  Revolutionary change, as the name implies, is rapid and dramatic.  In some 
cases it is planned; in other cases it is a response to a crisis.  Events that trigger 
revolutionary change include being a participant in a merger, major restructuring, large 
scale process reengineering or the implementation of dramatic changes in operating 
procedures. 
 Minor organizational changes often require a brief period of adjustment.  Not 
surprisingly, large-scale changes in work routine, responsibilities or reward systems 
typically require a longer adjustment period and are met with a correspondingly high 
level of employee resistance. 
The Relationship Between Change and Culture 
 “Change always threatens a culture” (Deal & Kennedy, 1982, p. 157).  People 
form strong attachments to heroes, legends, rituals and values.  Major change, possibly in 
the form of a merger, strips these relationships and leaves employees confused, insecure, 
and sometimes angry. The new leadership may realign the organization but may topple 
heroes that people have revered since the company began.  Unless something is done to 
provide support for the transition, the force of the old culture can neutralize a proposed 
change (Deal & Kennedy, 1982). In work published 17 years later, the same two 
researchers reported that mergers affect cultural patterns in three ways separated in time 
from the date the deal is announced.  First, employees try to figure out where cuts will be 
made. Uncertainty, apprehension and demoralization are prevalent in this phase.  Most 
think that little or no thought is given to the merits, skills, or previous contributions of the 
people who will lose their jobs as a result of the merger.  Second, employees of the 
acquiring company feel like the winners and employees of the company being acquired 
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feel like the losers.  The winners congregate, make decisions, and impose their will as 
they always did. The losers withdraw and eventually exit the organization.  Third, the 
survivors discover that the company they now work for is significantly different from the 
one they worked for before. In mergers of companies with dramatically different 
corporate cultures, it was concluded that cultural collisions result in cultural isolation for 
the surviving employees of the acquired firm (Deal & Kennedy, 1999). 
Proactive Approaches Towards Changing Corporate Culture 
The literature reveals some interesting variations on the subject of changing 
corporate culture. An examination of these themes and prescribed techniques as proposed 
over the last two decades by authors and researchers follows in chronological order. 
1982 Deal and Kennedy 
As recently as 23 years ago, researchers and authors Deal and Kennedy proposed 
that culture change is only necessary in five situations: (1) When the business 
environment is undergoing overall change and the company has always been value 
driven; (2) When the industry is highly competitive and the environment changes 
quickly; (3) When the company’s performance is mediocre or worse; (4) When the 
company is truly at the threshold of becoming a Fortune 1000-scale company; (5) When 
the company is growing very rapidly.  “In most other situations, large-scale cultural 
change should simply not be undertaken” (Deal & Kennedy, 1982, p. 161).  Additionally, 
they state that the argument for change must be credible or else the manager won’t 
convince anyone.   Major change efforts fail because not enough is put into them.  In 
some cases, attempting to make a culture change is simply not economical. 
When attempting a culture change was absolutely mandated, the techniques  
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prescribed by Deal and Kennedy include: (1) Position a hero in charge of the process; (2) 
Recognize a real threat from the outside; (3) Make transition rituals the pivotal elements 
of change; (4) Provide transition training in the new values and behavior patterns; (5) 
Bring in outsiders to help; (6) Build tangible symbols of the new directions; and (7) Insist 
on the importance of job security during the transition. 
1985 Trice and Beyer 
Their position was that deliberately changing a culture is a gradual, incremental 
and difficult process.  (This theme prevails over the next two decades in all the literature).  
Since one of the ways that people originally learn work-related cultures is through a 
socialization process of rites and rituals, cultural change can be facilitated this way as 
well.  The technique for facilitating change as proposed by these researchers is embodied 
in the performance of rites and rituals as shown in Table 2.  
Table 2 
Trice and Beyer’s Techniques for Facilitating Change 
Category of 
Organizational Rite 
Example Expressive Social 
Consequences 
Rites of passage Induction and basic military  
 
training. 
Minimize variations in the  
 




Rites of degradation Termination of the top  
 
executive or cultural   
 
laggards. 
Dissolve social identities and  
 
their associated power. 
 
Rites of enhancement 
 
Public recognition of  
 
accomplishments and  
 
 
Enhance social identities and  
 
their associated power. 
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celebration of successes. 
 
Rites of renewal Organizational development  
 
activities. 
Reconstruct social structures  
 














Rites of integration 
 
Office holiday party. 
 
Encourage and revive shared 
feelings that bind people 
together and keep them 
committed to a social system. 
Planning events that allow 
venting of emotion.  Today at 
Dollar Thrifty this is called 
providing an environment 
that encourages fierce 
dialogue. 
Note. Adapted from Trice & Beyer (1985) 
 
1989 Buono and Bowditch 
 Most people will support culture change if they can understand the need for it.  
However, there are limits to the amount and rate of change people are able to assimilate. 
Furthering this theme by Trice and Beyer, Buono and Bowditch suggest that it might be 
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necessary to recruit new employees to replace any incumbents who do not or cannot buy-
in to the new values and beliefs. 
1992 Conner 
The combination of crises that organizations face today makes the need for 
culture change truly urgent.  Since a major function of culture is its own self-
preservation, managers should not think that making a culture change is a quick fix. 
Conner further said that culture change is either evolutionary (unplanned and 
emerging) or architectural (intentional).  After a merger or acquisition there are three 
types of working relationships that will produce a positive cultural environment (Table 
3). The techniques Conner prescribes for an architectural culture change includes: (1) 
Senior management defines the specific characteristics of the new culture; (2) 
Management develops a cultural audit to locate gaps; (3) Action plans are made to close 
the gaps; and (4) Actions are initiated. 
Table 3 




Coexistence Occurs when the two different cultures live and work 
together.  Both maintain most or all of their pre-merger 







Occurs when the dominant culture prevails either through 
natural forces or greater strength.  One company must 




Transformation More likely to be seen in mergers than in acquisitions.  
Involves the identification and adaptation of best 
practices from both organizations being merged. 
 
1992 Kotter and Heskett 
 These two Harvard Business School researchers said that the first books on 
corporate culture including those by Pascale & Athos (1981), Peters & Waterman (1982), 
Davis (1984), Deal & Kennedy (1982), and Ouchi (1981) either avoided the subject or 
offered simplistic prescriptions for making major changes.  In 22 cases of attempted 
cultural change studied by the Kotter and Heskett (1992), the managers who tended to 
declare victory on the slimmest of evidence admitted they failed in 16 of the situations. 
Their approach: The key to success is having an effective leader who has an outsider’s 
perspective and an insider’s resources.  
1992 Schein 
 Once the culture has stabilized in a mature organization, manipulations to change 
it are often limited or superficial in their effects. Schein’s (1992) dynamics of change are 
tied to those derived by Kurt Lewin in 1947 and refer to the change process at the 
individual, group, or organizational level.   
Unfreezing.  Lewin, first, and then Schein suggest that for any part of the core 
structure to change in other than an incremental way, the system must first experience 
enough disequilibrium to force a coping process and create a motivation to change.  
Schein defined three distinct components of this unfreezing process: (1) the presentation 
of enough disconfirming data to cause serious discomfort; (2) the creation of anxiety or 
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guilt as a result of this disconfirming data; and (3) the sense of psychological safety in 
solving the problem without a loss of identity or integrity. Examples of disconfirming 
data are an increase in turnover or a marked reduction in sales. 
Cognitive restructuring.  After being unfrozen, the change process reflects either 
new learning or role modeling.  The essence of this is often the cognitive redefinition of 
some basic assumptions.  For example, a company may cognitively redefine workforce 
layoffs as early retirements and provide extensive outplacement benefits.  Schein reports 
this, in many cases, as a cognitive redefinition on the part of senior management more 
than simply rationalization.  Similarly, ambiguity and conflict result when employees 
who belong to different groups are influenced by the assumptions that are appropriate to 
the other group.  Tolerance for ambiguity will vary between companies and managers 
(Schein, 1992). 
Refreezing.  This final step, according to Schein, refers to the necessity for the 
new behavior and for the set of cognitions to be reinforced.  Without this confirmation 
the search and coping process will continue.   With it, “…new assumptions gradually 
stabilize until new disconfirmations start the change process all over again” (Schein, 
1992, p. 303). 
1992 – 1996 Cartwright and Cooper 
 Picking-up on Schein’s theme, Cartwright and Cooper addressed the subject of 
post-merger culture change directly by saying that any decision to change, integrate or 
maintain culture after a merger requires (1) an understanding of the cultural and sub-
cultural values and beliefs throughout both organization; (2) an unfreezing of the existing 
cultures; (3) a positive presentation of the future; (4) wide-scale involvement of all 
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employees; (5) adoption of a realistic time frame for change; (6) process for monitoring 
problems before they escalate. 
 They recommend the use of cultural informants, joint working parties and inter-
organizational team-building initiatives.  Four different approaches to culture change are 
suggested: 
1. Aggressive approach. This is the most commonly adopted approach by 
acquirers taking over smaller or less successful companies than theirs.  Militaristic tactics 
are often used to wipeout or tear down the old cultural regime.  This approach is 
characterized by its “…time urgency and lack of respect for organizational past” 
(Cartwright & Cooper, 1996, p. 132). 
2. Conciliative approach. Defined by the response to people as rational beings on 
whom coercion is unnecessary.  This approach is often ineffective because employees 
may not recognize that their old culture has become obsolete and they do not feel 
compelled to respond.   
3. Corrosive approach. This is a political approach that gains the participation of 
various alliances and coalitions within the organization and then manipulates them to 
achieve participation by other groups.  The technique utilizes the invisible covert and 
informal power network.  The disadvantage is that the key constituencies may be as 
likely to resist cultural change as they are to accept it. 
4. Indoctrinative approach.  The objective of this approach is to train the new 
culture through planned learning and cultural conditioning.  This is a passive approach 
that can fail if the employees interpret it as propaganda. 
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Cartwright and Cooper conclude that there is no one best approach to culture 
change.  They report that any single approach may be ineffective and would have to be 
complemented by an additional approach.  
1993 Nahavandi and Malekzadeh 
 The heart of the Nahavandi and Malekzadeh model is acculturation, which is the 
process by which two or more cultures come into contact and resolve the resulting 
conflict. There are four general ways in which two cultures can interact when they come 
into contact: 
Assimilation.  One of the two firms – most likely the acquired company – gives up 
its practices, procedures and philosophies and becomes totally assimilated into the 
acquiring firm.  The flow of change is one-way.  The acquired firm relinquishes its 
culture and the acquirer does not change.  Overall, in assimilation, the acquired firm 
ceases to exist as a legal entity and as a cultural entity. 
Integration.  The acquirer allows the acquired firm some degree of freedom and 
independence to maintain its own culture.  As such, the acquired firm retains most of the 
cultural elements that provide it with its unique identity. Both companies are structurally 
assimilated but not culturally assimilated. 
Separation.  An attempt is made to allow both organizations to stay separate and 
keep their heritage cultures. Essential to the success of this style is having little or no 
contact or exchange between the firms.   
Deculturation.  The least positive and the least desirable form of acculturation 
involve the loss of all cultural and managerial characteristics. Deculturation typically 
occurs when the acquired firm’s culture is weak allowing the employees to abandon it at 
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the same time they are not willing to adopt the acquiring firm’s culture. Deculturation 
leads to the highest level of organizational conflict.   
1993 Pritchett and Pound 
 These writers prescribe bold culture change methods that stand in stark contrast to 
the softer, kinder approach of many other researchers and practitioners. To be effective, 
Pritchett and Pound say that “Your approach to changing the culture should be highly out 
of character for the organization” (p. 2) because culture changes move slowly unless 
drastic steps are employed.  Although some of their 22 steps may seem controversial, 
several of them are seen frequently in use after takeovers and mergers. The Pritchett and 
Pound model and the Nahavandi and Malekzadeh model are at extreme ends of the 
change continuum.  Highlights of the Pritchett and Pound culture change model include: 
 Visibility. Make the culture change initiative very obvious by utilizing heavy-duty 
intervention and deliberately destabilization of the group. 
 Discard.  Time spent analyzing the old culture is time wasted and should be used 
to focus on the future. 
 Preemptive.  Disarm the old culture and redirect the energy toward new clear 
goals. 
 Reward.  Change the reward system to be in synch with the new culture.  Not 
doing this will essentially reward resistance. 
 Keep score.  Metrics of success should be decided upon, progress tracked and 
results posted. 
 Live it.  Promote the change relentlessly.  Demonstrate unwavering commitment. 
 Cheerlead.  Initiate a high volume of high quality communications. 
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 Expect casualties.  Anticipate that 20% of the people will buy-in immediately, 
50% will be undecided and slow to commit, and 30% will be anti-change.  “You 
will be better off getting rid of them” (Pritchett & Pound, 2003, p. 22). 
 Make other changes.  Make structural and administrative changes that are 
incompatible with the old culture.  For example, discard the old policy and 
procedures manual for a new set of guidelines. 
 Bring in a new breed.  Outsiders arrive in a responsive mood. 
 Don’t trust loyalty.  Loyalty to the organization is good.  Loyalty to the old 
culture is a way of hiding resistance to change and can be damaging. 
 Build a power base.  Your best people should get the big jobs.  Concentrate on 
surrounding yourself with only highly committed allies. 
 Orient, educate and train.  Employees will break from old habits if you teach 
them new routines.  “If you’re going to break the grip of the old culture, seize 
control of the schools” Pritchett & Pound, 2003, p. 42). 
1993 Trice and Beyer 
 Performing a planned culture change is just like making a break with the past.  It 
is an inherently disequilibriating process. The change process can be categorized three 
ways: (1) Revolutionary and comprehensive attempts to change the culture of whole 
organizations; (2) Efforts to change or contain certain sub-cultures; (3) Gradual and 
incremental efforts intended to comprehensively reshape an entire organization’s culture. 
In the eight years since they originally published their process for making a 
culture change, these researchers have expanded their recommendations considerably.  
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Now, their previously cited use of rites and rituals has become just one of the eight 
prescribed steps. As of their 1993 publication, Trice and Beyer recommend: 
Seizing a propitious moment.  Initiating the change in concert with an obvious 
problem or opportunity. Culture change is oftentimes best initiated when the organization 
is experiencing a defining moment.  It may even be necessary for senior management to 
dramatize the circumstances that call for change to stakeholders in order to gain their 
support and cooperation.  The defining moment might be the merger itself of fierce 
competitors or the loss of a major account or a severe service disruption. 
Combine caution with optimism.  Managers must have confidence that they can 
succeed.  They should realize that cultures will change anyway and that it is up to them to 
channel it properly.  “Consistency and persistence … is absolutely essential in conveying 
optimism and confidence” (Trice & Beyer, 1993, p. 418). 
Understand resistance to change.  Common sources of resistance to change at the 
individual level include fear of the unknown, self interest, selective attention, 
dependence, and need for security.  At the organizational level they include threats to 
power and influence, lack of trust, different perceptions and goals, and resource 
limitations. 
Change many elements but maintain some continuity.  Honor the past by 
identifying principles that will remain constant. This is, however, difficult because 
components of prior cultural practices and new ideologies may be in conflict with each 
other. 
Recognize the importance of implementation.  The stages of change include 
adoption, implementation, and institutionalization (Trice & Beyer in Shafritz & Ott, 
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1993).  Adoption is simply the decision to make some change; Implementation is the 
action of putting the change into place; Institutionalization is the persistent incorporation 
of the change into the daily routines. 
Select, modify and create appropriate cultural forms.  “Although rites and rituals 
can act as levers for change … change is clearly not their usual purpose” (Trice & Beyer 
in Shafritz & Ott, 1993, p. 420). Culture can be modified by changing or eliminating 
long-standing metaphors that depict an old organizational ideology,  
Modify socialization tactics.  The primary way that people learn their cultures is 
through the socialization processes they experience.  If these processes are changed the 
culture will begin to change.  This affects newcomers as well as people in the 
organization who are being accustomed to their new roles and responsibilities. 
Find and cultivate innovative leadership.  The most important quality this person 
should have is the ability to convince members of the organization to give up the security 
they derive from their previous culture and follow the new leader.  This may require the 
removal of prominent members of the old culture (through firing, offering an enticing 
retirement package, or some form of degradation. 
1996 Quinn 
“Organizational change cannot occur unless we accept the pain of personal 
change” (Quinn, 1996, p. 193).  In Deep Change, Quinn introduces the work he 
subsequently publishes with Cameron on building a competing values framework (a 
description follows).  Although Quinn urges us to use the leader within us to confront 
issues and make deep, organization wide changes, his techniques seem deliberative, staid 
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and time consuming.  Quinn would be at the opposite end of the spectrum from Pritchett 
and Pound. 
1999 Cameron and Quinn 
 The researchers propose that failure to change organizational culture will doom 
other attempted organizational changes.  They suggest that having a clear understanding 
of the existing culture is the basis of determining the desired culture. 
 Cameron and Quinn developed an Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument 
(OCAI) to diagnose the existing corporate culture. The OCAI is based on a competing 
values framework that illustrates the cultural tendencies of the organization.  These are 
plotted in terms of degrees of control and discretion. 
1999 Deal and Kennedy 
 There seems to be consensus that in cases of mergers and acquisitions, culture 
changes only reluctantly.  The culture of the old firms always lives on in the minds and 
hearts of the survivors. Vestiges of an entrenched culture will fight back during times of 
stress or in pockets of masses of surviving employees.  Confirming what was previously 
known, Deal and Kennedy said that productivity and performance in companies pieced 
together by mergers will most likely suffer.  Deal and Kennedy’s premise, now, is that 




 Repeating the theme he and others espoused earlier, the person most frequently 
quoted regarding corporate culture proposes two ways of changing culture.  Schein 
(1999) says the first, planned and managed culture change, will have a greater likelihood 
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of success if culture is no longer linked to popular leaders, founders or family members.  
Further, it is helpful to link whatever changes need to be made to existing cultural 
assumptions rather than starting over with the announcement of a new culture.  He 
proposes, also, the establishment of a cultural committee and other procedural supportive 
interventions.  However, if the above does not produce the desired business results, 
Schein advises taking drastic steps including bringing in a new Chief Executive Officer 
from the outside that has a different set of values and assumptions from those of the 
present culture.  
2001 Ackerman Anderson and Anderson 
 
 These two researchers wrote that transformational changes are culture-dependent 
and require a focused effort to study the organization’s current culture and clarify its 
desired culture.  They prescribe that, in addition to the classic components of culture 
(norms, language, stories, etc.), this includes assessing and shaping the mindset of the 
organization – its guiding principles, ways of being, assumptions and values. 
 Their recommendation is to form a culture-scanning team made up of 
representatives from all work groups. The culture-scanning team would recommend how 
the new culture should be reflected in the new organization’s operating practices, 
processes and structures.   Any aspect of culture, style, or behavior could come under this 
group’s study.  
2001 Meyerson 
 
Meyerson promotes the belief that radical change should be made in a gentle way 
and that corporate culture can be changed by using incremental and inconspicuous 
approaches. The basis of this is that organizations can change through drastic action or 
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through evolutionary adaptation. Since drastic change is usually discontinuous and 
mandated and evolutionary change is continuous, gentle, and decentralized, it would 
follow that incremental, evolutionary change will produce a broad and lasting shift. 
Meyerson recommends four techniques to achieve this: 
• Disruptive self-expression.  This could be a personal demonstration of one’s 
values or a deliberate act of protest and reinforces the importance of the 
individual’s convictions. 
• Verbal jujitsu.  Describes when a person redirects the force of an intensive 
statement or action to improve the situation. 
• Variable-term opportunists.  Capitalize on short and long-term chances for 
change. 
• Strategic alliance building.   Described as the process of joining with others to 
make change with more force. 
2003 Beitler 
 
Organizational culture can be changed indirectly as well as directly. A change in 
strategy (e.g. from low cost producer to niche provider) will affect culture indirectly.   
Attempting to make direct changes to a culture “…can lead to enormous frustration” 
(Beitler, 2003, p. 124) because of how deep the roots of culture go. Planned change is 
often seen as forced and threatening. 
 The benefits of the planned change must be sold to the employees.  Beitler 
prescribes finding and changing something easy first.  Follow that with a celebration. 







This researcher reports that the only way of effectively making a culture change is 
by bringing-in outsiders to engineer the change.   This is because senior managers feel 
that “…culture causes most corporate catastrophes whereas brilliant leadership accounts 
for successes” (Abrahamson, 2004, p. 93). He goes on to say that the conceptual lack of 
understanding regarding the meaning of the term culture is one of the key obstacles to 
making positive change.  “If you want to know what water is, don’t ask the fish.”  (p. 94). 
Since we perceive something only when we perceive what it is not, corporate cultures 
become indiscernible to those immersed in them.  The only way to make change is to 
bring in an outsider who can see a culture for what it is and what it is not.   Crafting 
change in an organization’s culture is often a matter of simply cloning elements of a 
culture that existed previously or already exist in another company division. 
An Opposing Point of View 
 Kotter and Cohen (2002) and Stringer (2002) advanced an opposing opinion that 
culture comes last rather than first in organizational change.  Enterprises often try to 
modify corporate culture first to increase the speed of acceptance and reduce the natural 
resistance to change.  Their conclusion is that “… culture truly changes only when a new 
way of operating has shown to succeed over some minimum period of time” (Kotter & 
Cohen, 2002, p. 176).   Trying to shift the norms and values before the new way of 
operating has been created will be unsuccessful, in their opinion.  Although a company 
can define the behaviors that reflect a desired culture, the culture does not change until 
those behaviors become norms.  Stringer, similarly, said that cultural change is 
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discouragingly slow. “The point is not to change culture; it is to change performance” 
(Stringer, 2002, p. 16). 
Summary – Organizational Change Literature 
 Organizational change is an ongoing event.  Some changes happen slowly and 
affect the company gradually, others are more dramatic, drastic, and immediate. It has 
been known for at least the last two decades that change always threatens a culture (Deal 
& Kennedy, 1982).  Similarly, it is also known that it is often appropriate to modify an 
organization’s culture to assist with the success of a large-scale organizational change – 
such as a merger or an acquisition. 
 Approaches towards changing corporate culture have evolved dramatically over 
recent years from gentle to drastic to gentle.  In 1982 Deal and Kennedy wrote that 
culture change is only appropriate to address five specific conditions. In most cases, 
large-scale culture change should not be attempted. 
 Three years later, Trice and Beyer concluded that changing culture is possible 
albeit a gradual, incremental and difficult process.  Their prescription was to change six 
key organizational rites in order to enjoy the appropriate social consequences. 
 In 1992, Conner said that the combination of crises faced by organizations make 
the need for cultural change truly urgent.  Some culture change is evolutionary and some 
is architectural. 
 In the same year Edgar Schein devised a three-step plan for changing corporate 
culture.  His model included the promotion of disconfirming data followed by cognitive 
restructuring.  Following on Schein’s theme, British researchers Cartwright and Cooper 
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defined four different approaches to changing culture ranging from aggressive to 
conciliative, to corrosive to indoctrinative. 
 Nahavandi and Malekzadeh espoused their theory of culture change through the 
process of acculturation. They defined four styles of acculturation – each with its own 
level of conflict.  Also in 1993, Pritchett and Pound produced a 22 step culture change 
process that can be defined as being very much contrary to the earlier kinder-gentler 
theories.  One of the components of their theory, for example, is to simply eliminate 
workers who are opposed to change. 
 Trice and Beyer suggest synchronizing culture change with a defining moment in 
the organization. Their theory includes keeping some of the remnants of the old culture 
along with features of the new culture. 
 The pendulum swung away from Pritchett and Pound with Quinn’s (1996) 
research on making deep changes by using deliberate, staid, and time-consuming 
methods.  Later, Deal and Kennedy said that vestiges of the old culture will always live in 
the hearts and minds of the employees. Managers must be relentless in forging a new 
shared culture. 
 In 1999, Schein reiterated much of what he said about culture change in 1992.  
However, he said that it is helpful to link whatever changes need to be made to existing 
cultural assumptions rather than start over with the announcement of a whole new 
culture, Meyerson, in 2001, seems to agree and suggests that culture should be changed 
in a gentle, incremental and inconspicuous way. 
 Then, in 2003, Beitler said that attempting to make changes to a culture can be 
frustrating.  He identifies change with making a number of incremental steps and 
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celebrating each one.  Finally, in 2004, Abrahamson concludes that managers cannot 
identify the culture of their organization and should not be expected to change what they 
cannot see.  According to this researcher, effective change can only be made by outsiders. 
 
Industry and Company-Specific Literature 
This dissertation studies one merger that recently took place in the automobile 
rental industry and one from the railroad industry.  Apart from being service industries 
that provide a form of transportation, there are some important structural differences in 
each case. 
Merger in the Automobile Rental Industry 
The business of renting cars without drivers has been popular for only the last 50 
years.  The two companies in this case study were fierce competitors who attempted to 
attract customers from the same pool of travelers in the same markets.  The corporate 
culture of each player was very different, was tied to its heritage, and was not necessarily 
complementary to each other.  Proactive steps were taken by senior management to avert 
an anticipated culture clash. 
Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group Facts 
 The Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group, with its corporate headquarters in Tulsa, 
Oklahoma, is a Fortune 1000 company.  In mid-2006 it is the only publicly traded 
company of the eight major players in the car rental industry.  Dollar and Thrifty’s 
competitors include the Hertz Corporation (which has announced an Initial Public 
Offering for late 2006); Avis and Budget Rent A Car which are owned by Cendant (and 
which have also announced an IPO for late 2006); National and Alamo which are owned 
by privately held Vanguard, Inc. (also planning an IPO in 2006); and Enterprise, which is 
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privately held.  The Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group has 800 corporate and franchise 
rental locations in the United States and Canada.  The company has 8,500 employees, 
acquires 120,000 automobiles annually, and produced a profit of  $58.4 million in 2005 
on revenues of $1.5 billion (up from $50.8 million on $1.42 billion in revenue in 2004). 
Dollar Rent A Car and Thrifty Car Rental started as independent privately held 
companies. Thrifty was established in Tulsa in 1958 and immediately adopted a franchise 
model.  Thirty-one years later the Chrysler Corporation purchased the company for $262 
million.  Dollar was known as Dollar-A-Day Rent A Car when it was founded in 1965 in 
Los Angeles.  The company’s current Chief Executive started with the company three 
years later in 1968.  Dollar stayed independent until 1990 when it, too, was acquired by 
the Chrysler Corporation.  Around the same time, Chrysler purchased a third car rental 
company, Snappy, to service the insurance replacement car rental niche and formed its 
Pentastar Transportation Group, Inc. composed of Thrifty, Dollar and Snappy.  In 1994, 
Chrysler spun-off Snappy because of a lack of strategic fit.  Then, in December 1997, 
Chrysler disposed of Dollar and Thrifty by taking them public in an IPO that brought 
$461.3 million.  For this study it is important to note that before and during all of these 
changes of ownership, Dollar and Thrifty were operated as separate brands with separate 
fleets and separate facilities with no shared employees and no overlapping management.  
A small group of executives oversaw both companies on behalf of Chrysler (this entity 
was known as the Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group). 
Both companies had “defining moments” which shaped their unique and opposing 
corporate cultures.  For Dollar, their defining moment was in 1994 when it adopted a 
strategy of operating corporately in the top 50 airport markets in the United States.  This 
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strategic move, along with an employee led turn-around during the same year, defined the 
organization as an operating company that was task driven.  Thrifty’s defining moment 
was in the same period when it chose to be a franchiser rather than a corporate store 
operator.  Although the company was as focused on results as Dollar, it concentrated on 
brand building, employee relationships and delivery of services to its licensees.  This 
gave it a markedly different corporate culture than Dollar. 
In December 2002 both companies combined in an exercise management titled 
Project Catapult.  This new corporate platform merged most headquarters support 
functions, the rental fleet, and the information technology systems.  In the field, back-lot 
operations of both brands were combined in cities where operations were corporately-
owned. With this event, the two previously separate operating companies (Dollar Rent A 
Car Systems, Inc. and Thrifty, Inc.) were merged into a single company known as the 
Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group. 
Using surplus cash, Dollar Thrifty gave licensee owners in larger cities an 
opportunity to sell their franchises back to the company. Many took advantage of the exit 
opportunity to the extent that in 2006 over 82% of Dollar Thrifty revenue comes from 
corporate-owned operations. With the merger, separate customer-facing rental counters 
were maintained giving the public the impression of dealing with independent companies. 
Also as a result of the merger, employees of one brand were now working along-side 
employees of what was once their competitor.  With this, many employees of one brand 
were now working for managers of the other brand.  Managers of both brands could be 
reporting to executives of either brand.  The cultural problems that were anticipated 
started to develop.  Productivity may have suffered and employees still considered 
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themselves to be part of their heritage dyad.  A cultural assessment was performed 
shortly after the merger that revealed the presence of two distinct cultures each with one 
major sub-culture.  These were classified as the Dollar culture; the Dollar-Florida sub-
culture; the Thrifty culture; and the Thrifty-Canada sub-culture.  The Dollar Thrifty 
Automotive Group employed (and is currently employing) a comprehensive, values-
driven, approach to making a post-merger culture change. 
The Dollar Thrifty approach consisted of studying the cultures of both 
predecessor companies, adopting the favored components of each, flooding the 
organization with icons and symbols (future artifacts), building a network of cultural 
advocates, initiating new policies, practices, programs and leadership training that 
supported the desired culture, and prescribing the behavior of its officers and employees.  
Today, Dollar Thrifty is a very profitable enterprise.  Although it is far from the largest, it 
frequently enjoys having the strongest profit margin of any company in the automobile 
rental industry. The study of this horizontal merger follows the changes and the steps 
Dollar Thrifty took to establish their new corporate culture after the companies were 
combined – and the effect it is having on employee attitude, motivation, and corporate 
earnings. 
Merger in the Railroad Industry 
American railroads have been moving freight and people since the close of the 
war with England in 1815. Because of the age of the railroad companies, the tenure of 
their employees, the strength of collective bargaining units, and the industry’s heritage of 
strong-willed leadership, each American railroad is rich with tradition.  Industry sources 
report that American railroad companies have individual personas and specific and 
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identifiable corporate cultures.  It is commonly stated that United States’ railroads 
received their militaristic hierarchy and rigid discipline from the Civil War officers who 
developed and expanded the railroad system after the war.  Others say that it was the 
other way around because many Army officers were railroad officers before the war 
(Hemphill. 2005).  Information is not available to suggest that the culture of a railroad is 
more difficult to change than the culture of companies in other industries. 
On October 14, 1980, President Jimmy Carter signed the Staggers Rail Act into 
law.  The legislation loosened the regulated railroad structure that existed since the 1887 
Interstate Commerce Act.  Staggers relieved government control on ratemaking, 
marketing, mergers and track abandonment and prompted the elimination of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC).  Almost immediately, the railroads took advantage of this 
deregulation and started merging with other railroads.  Table 4 lists 23 significant railroad 
acquisitions since the Act’s 1980 passage.  Airlines and the trucking industry were also 
deregulated during the Carter administration, “… but it was the railroads that were most 
in the need of regulatory relief” (Vantuono, 2005, p. 4).  "Most mergers [of railroads] had 
parallel or duplicate lines that were really surplus.  Unprofitable branch lines could be 
sold, leased, or abandoned.  Poorly maintained routes or those with steep grades were… 
candidates for elimination" (Stover, 1997, p. 247).  The mergers materially reduced the 
number of railroads in operation. In 1976 there were 52 Class I lines (largest revenue 
producers).  By 1995 it was down to eleven.  Today there are seven. 
Every one of these railroads has a corporate culture that is deep-rooted with 
history and tradition.  An interesting phenomenon is that today, smaller, regional 
railroads – which got their start as branch lines of the Class I’s were spun-off – are 
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starting to merge for some of the same scales of economy the largest railroads seek.  
There appears to be continuing opportunity for application of what this dissertation 
research should reveal. 
Union Pacific Railroad Company Facts 
 The Union Pacific Railroad Company is a fully owned subsidiary of the Union  
 
Pacific Corporation, headquartered in Omaha, Nebraska and incorporated in Utah.  The 
 
Union Pacific Railroad Company operates 7,531 locomotives and 87,500 of its own  
 









Class I Railroads in 2006 
 
 
U.S. RR Acquisitions Since Staggers Act 
  
Union Pacific Railroad Chicago and North Western Railway (1995) 
   33,000 Route miles Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad 
(1987) 
   49,747 Employees Missouri-Kansas-Texas (1987) 
   2005 Revenue: $13.6 billion Missouri Pacific Railroad (1982) 
   2005 Net Income: $1.8 billion Southern Pacific Railroad (1996) 
 Western Pacific Railroad (1982) 
  
 
Burlington Northern Santa Fe  
   32,000 Route miles Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway 
(1995) 
    40,000 Employees  
   2005 Revenue: $13.0 billion St. Louis – San Francisco Railway  (1980) 




CSX Baltimore & Ohio Railroad (1987) 
   22,100 Route miles Chesapeake & Ohio Railway (1987) 
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   35,138 Employees 42% of Consolidated Rail Corp. (Conrail)  
(1999) 
   2005 Revenue: $8.62 billion Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac 
(1991) 
   2005 Net Income: $1.55 billion Seaboard Air Line Railroad (1986) 
 Western Maryland Railway (1983) 
  
Norfolk Southern 58% of Consolidated Rail Corp. (Conrail)  
(1999) 
   21,300 Route miles  
   30,294 Employees Norfolk & Western (1982) 
   2005 Revenue: $8.5 billion  
   2005 Net Income: $1.3 billion Southern Railway (1982) 
  
Grand Trunk Corporation (Holding 
Company for Canadian National 
Railways in USA) 
Chicago, Missouri & Western (1987) 
   19,300 Route miles Illinois Central Railroad (1997) 
   21,790 Employees  
   2005 Revenue: $6.46 billion Wisconsin Central (2001) 
   2005 Net Income: $1.6 billion  
  
Canadian Pacific Railway Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific RR 
(1984) 
   13,800 Route miles  
   16,295 Employees Delaware & Hudson Company (1991) 
   2005 Revenue: $3.92 billion  
   2005 Net Income:  $0.5 billion Soo Line (2000) 
 
Kansas City Southern 
   3,130 Route miles 
   3,060 Employees 
   2005 Revenue: $1.35 billion 
   2005 Net Income: $0.1 billion 
None in U.S.A. 
Note. Developed from industry publications and journals. Acquisition Date Shown in 
Parentheses. 
 
The company employs 49,747 full time workers, 87% of whom are represented by 14 
major railroad unions.  In 2005, the Union Pacific Corporation reported a net income of 
$1.8 billion on sales of $13.6 billion. The company’s market value in the same year was 
$16.47 billion. For purposes of clarity and readability throughout this dissertation, the 
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Union Pacific Corporation and the Union Pacific Railroad Company will be referred to as 
simply Union Pacific. 
Union Pacific and Southern Pacific History 
 In the 19th Century, railroads in the western United States fell into two distinct 
categories: grain carrying grangers and transcontinentals (Saunders, 2001).  This second 
group was composed of the long-haul railroads that crossed the mountain ranges and the 
deserts to reach the Pacific coast. 
 The Union Pacific was the eastern half of the first transcontinental.  The Central 
Pacific (predecessor to the Southern Pacific) owned the western half and together it was 
known as the Overland Route. The Union Pacific had its own lines to Seattle and Los 
Angeles, while the Southern Pacific’s lines followed a more southerly route.  On the west 
coast, the Southern Pacific had a practical monopoly on north-south traffic.   
It built California with a power that no private enterprise was ever intended to 
have: before 1910, it was a matter of indifference to the railroad whether the 
Republicans or the Democrats won the statehouse because [the Southern Pacific] 
owned them both.  (Saunders, 2001, p. 15) 
One of the fabled railroad barons, Edward H. Harriman, owner of the Southern 
Pacific, brought the two companies together for the first time in 1900.  Harriman’s 
intention was to create an empire that would stretch from Chicago to the five major west 
coast cities (Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego). However, in 
1906 the Interstate Commerce Commission found that his empire was harmful to the 
public interest.  By 1913, the Supreme Court ordered the break-up of Harriman’s empire 
giving a short life to the first of two Union Pacific – Southern Pacific mergers. 
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 In the 1950’s, as a freestanding railroad, the Union Pacific used its power and its 
central position to control the movement of cargo from the granger railroads to the west 
coast.  With the exception of the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, and Pacific Railway, the 
five grangers lacked funding to finance their own routes to the west and were forced to 
interchange cars with the Union Pacific in Nebraska.  The C., M., St.P., & P. venture to 
the west coast ended in 1980 after being in service 71 years. At the time, the Union 
Pacific’s hub and operations headquarters was in Omaha and its executive/corporate 
headquarters was in New York City. “…the UP was a railroad so proud of its traditions, 
with so much to be proud of, that it promoted only from within and only those who 
shared the corporate culture” (Saunders, 2001, p. 322). 
The Southern Pacific was proud of its heritage, too.  From 1901 to the 1950’s, 
Southern Pacific management was intensely concerned with public relations, and 
cultivating close associations with business and civic leaders (Matthews, 1996). 
Both predecessor companies have a long history of mergers and acquisitions of 
their own as shown in Figure 4. One combination, Union Pacific’s acquisition of the 
Chicago & North Western [sic], is especially noteworthy because it represented the first 
of two post-merger meltdowns that crippled the system.   The merger gave the Union 
Pacific a direct route from Omaha to Chicago and was reported in the trade press as a 
merger that “…should have been a piece of cake … [but] pretty soon everything was at a 
standstill” (Frailey, 2005, p. 33). 
The Union Pacific Buyout of the Southern Pacific 
In recent years, the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific railroads served adjacent 
regions of the United States and initially handed cars loaded with freight off to each 
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other.  The managers of both companies felt that the merger of these two rail lines would 
simply make for a larger, end-to-end, rail system – a classic market extension merger.  To 
one writer, “…all the savings and all the efficiencies of seamless service were within 
instantaneous grasp” (Saunders, 2003, p. 329).  At 10 a. m. on September 11, 1996, the 
Union Pacific became the largest railroad in the United States.  However, within months 
of its $5.4 billion buyout of the Southern Pacific, railroad traffic in Texas ground to a halt 
and associated equipment shortages affected train traffic in other parts of the country.  
Public reports were that severe differences in operating practices, management styles and 
corporate cultures between the Union Pacific and the Southern Pacific contributed to the 
melt-down which nearly paralyzed all railroad freight movements (and interstate 
commerce) in the United States and resulted in government intervention, a shareholder 
lawsuit, and corporate reorganization.  Richard Davidson, Union Pacific's chairman, said 
that the problems the railroad suffered in 1997 and 1998 were caused by a combination of 
factors, including "…a lack of integration with respect to that merger" (Monroe, 1997, 
on-line). 
The Union Pacific had good management and a good cash condition. However,  
railroaders and insiders said that Union Pacific employees exhibited an aura of 
superiority and disregarded the operational expertise of the Southern Pacific employees 
in their own territory. 
Wall Street and the Union Pacific bankers were looking for a rapid return on 
investment.  Additionally, a personal financial incentive for Union Pacific executives was 
in place. According to Union Pacific proxy statements, if profits exceeded $5 a share the 
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railroad would forgive $31 million in loans given to top managers to purchase 1 million 
shares of the railroad. 
Problems Following the Buyout 
By June of 1997, nine months after the buyout, the Houston terminal district 
began to clog. When Houston began to congest, trains backed-up waiting to get in.  
Trains could not leave the many classification yards because they needed the locomotives 
coupled to stalled in-bound trains. This tied-up trackage, locomotives, and crews and 
prevented the pick-up and delivery of cargo from shippers.  Not having other shipping 
sources, cargo sat idle, ruining perishable freight.  At one point,  the whole Chemical 
Coast district of southern Texas was in gridlock and the route was choked all the way 
from Houston to Long Beach, California. Large shipments of chlorine were delayed to 
the City of Los Angeles threatening the public water supply. On a Monday in November 
1997, the Union Pacific had 227 trains holding for crews, locomotives, or stuck in 
congestion. It took 15 days for one Union Pacific freight train to make it from Fort Worth  
 
Figure 4.  Union Pacific and Southern Pacific merger activity since 1980. 
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to its destination in Texarkana – a distance of 250 miles.  By December 1997, the damage 
to the economy was over two billion dollars (Saunders, 2003).  Crews were forced to 
work 12-hour shifts 7 days a week and were falling asleep on the job.  Dispatching errors 
and operator fatigue caused collisions, fires, hazardous material spills, and deaths. The 
company had five serious accidents in three months that took seven lives and cost 
millions of dollars in damages (Suroweicki, 1997). 
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) conducted a 14-day safety inspection 
of the Union Pacific with an 80 person federal-state team and found significant safety 
deficiencies in training, dispatching, and employee fatigue (Ingles, 1997).  The FRA 
found evidence of dispatcher stress, widespread examples of employee harassment and 
intimidation, lack of employee education on operating rules, and the disregard of 
federally required daily safety briefings.  A railroad reporter commented that “After 
decades of downsizing, Union Pacific…either cannot realize they are in a growth mode, 
or realize it and cannot adjust” (Ingles, 1997, p. 22).  The differences in operating styles 
and employee attitudes of both railroad participants in this merger played a major role in 
what the popular press described as a meltdown and a loss of managerial control of the 
railroad. 
Chapter Summary 
Worldwide, mergers and acquisitions have been utilized extensively for corporate  
growth and the trend is expected to continue.  In 2005 the value of mergers and 
acquisitions involving a United States company (as either an acquirer or the acquired) 
exceeded $1 trillion.  Interestingly, mergers continue to be popular despite evidence that 
suggests that two-thirds of the combinations will either fail or lose value in the 
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marketplace.  One of the reasons cited for this high failure rate is the incompatibility of 
the cultures of the two combining organizations.  Every business organization has a 
unique corporate culture, those deep-seated attitudes, beliefs, values, and customs that 
define how the company thinks, behaves and makes decisions. Culture can be changed.  
The process, however, is reported by most researchers to be gradual with only 
incremental successes. 
 Either of three general cultural events can occur after a merger: (1) one company 
can assimilate the culture of the other, (2) both companies can integrate and share cultural 
features, (3) both companies can co-exist and maintain their previous cultures. 
The theories of organizational change regarding corporate culture have been fluid 
over the last two decades.  They range from a recommendation to do nothing, to a 
sensitive, education-based, approach to a bold, pre-emptive, high-powered prescription 
for making a post-merger culture change. 
The two mergers selected for this case study research employed change methods 
at the extreme end of the spectrum.  The Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group identified the 
desirable attributes of both merger participants. Management flooded the organization 
with icons and artifacts and initiated new programs, policies and practices that support 
the desired culture.  The Union Pacific simply required that the Southern Pacific 
employees adopt its operating practices and rules-based culture, effectively extinguishing 
the Southern Pacific predecessor culture. Because of the loss of knowledgeable Southern 




Research questions raised as a result of this review are shown in Figure 5.  The 
intent of the post-merger culture change study is the development of three themes: 
approach, execution and results.  Specifically, what steps did senior leadership take to 
manage post-merger culture, how was it implemented, and, what was the effect of the 







This dissertation research is a qualitative case study examination.  The 
transportation industry – and these particular mergers– were selected for study for three 
reasons: (1) The different transportation sectors chosen are in the midst of an ongoing 
trend towards further consolidations, (2) The organizational size, corporate background, 
and post-merger culture change approach variations will give the results appeal to a wider 
audience of potential users, and, (3) The visible results of each post-merger culture 
change approach suggested variations in degrees of success.  Accordingly, the results of 
this research have value and may be transferable to other companies in the transportation 
industry that are considering a merger. 
Purpose Statement 
 The purpose of this research is to explore the intent, consequences and perceived 
effectiveness of the different post-merger culture change approaches used in the subject 
mergers. Learning took place by developing an understanding of the intentions of 
management and the experiences of individuals at different levels in the organizations.  
These findings are reported in case study format.  The participants of the study 
represented a range of affected employees including executives, managers, front line 
service providers, and support personnel.  Because of the face-to-face nature of the 
interviews, the study can be described as having media richness.  The research took place 
at, or near, the headquarters location of each organization as well as at some selected 
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field sites. A qualitative rather than quantitative study was selected for these reasons: (1) 
the research is rooted in empiricism.  As such, an important component of the research 
was based on observations and participant interviews conducted in their natural setting; 
(2) the research is naturalistic, interpretive and draws on multiple methods of inquiry; (3) 
the research focuses on description and analysis of pre and post-merger conditions and is 
fundamentally interpretive. 
The Basic Characteristics of Qualitative Studies 
 Rossman and Rallis (1998) stated that a legitimate qualitative study incorporates 
several characteristics.  Their characteristics and how this post-merger culture change 
case study research addresses them follow. 
Natural Setting 
 Qualitative research takes place in the natural setting.  In order to develop an 
acceptable level of detail about the post-merger culture change, this researcher has 
traveled to the site of the mergers and solely participated in the recording of the 
participants’ actual experiences, perceptions and opinions. 
Multiple Methods Used 
 Qualitative research uses multiple, interactive, and humanistic data collection 
methods.  The data collections methods that were used in the post-merger culture change 
study included open-ended interviews, observations, and document examination. Yin 
(1993), a leading authority on applied social research, reported that the case study is the 
method of choice when the phenomenon under study is not readily distinguishable from 
its context.  He points out that the richness of the context means that the ensuing study 
will likely have more variables than data points. He also states that this richness means 
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that the study cannot rely on a single data collection method but will need to use multiple 
sources of evidence. 
Multiple-case studies, according to Yin, should follow replication logic rather 
than a sampling logic.  This means that two or more cases should be included within the 
same study because the researcher believes that similar results (replications) will be 
found.  The development of consistent findings, over multiple cases and even multiple 
studies, can then be considered as having strength (Yin, 1993, p. 34).  Similarly, the 
research may uncover a lack of replication that could identify suitability for certain 
dependent variables. 
Emergent, Not Tightly Prefigured 
 Qualitative research is emergent rather than tightly prefigured.  During the post-
merger culture change study, research questions were refined as different willing sources 
and perspectives of information were identified. The evolving nature of the research 
made it difficult to tightly prefigure at the proposal stage. Phenomenological researchers 
often conduct what may appear to be loosely structured interviews because the core 
questions of the interview may be altered if it seems appropriate as the interview 
progresses (Rudestam & Newton, 2001). 
Interpretive 
 Qualitative research is fundamentally interpretive.  As Rossman and Rallis (2003) 
discussed, it is impossible to escape the personal interpretation of the researcher.  This 






 The qualitative researcher views social phenomena holistically.  By nature, this 
study of post-merger culture change appears as more of a broad panoramic view than a 
microanalysis.  However, to maximize the usefulness of its content to others concerned 
with post-merger culture change, perspective of the consequences and effectiveness at 
different employee levels was sought. 
Awareness of Personal Bias 
 The qualitative researcher is sensitive to how his personal biography shapes the 
study.  Since the post-merger culture change study includes a culture change that this 
researcher was a participant and co-designer of, it requires a great degree of honesty, 
openness to the research and introspection.  In many cases, “The personal-self becomes 
inseparable from the researcher-self” (Creswell, 2003, p. 182). 
Complex Reasoning  
 The qualitative researcher uses complex reasoning.  The reasoning process in a 
qualitative study can be both inductive, deductive, and iterative.  Rossman and Rallis 
(2003) refer to a process of continual cycling between data collection, analysis and 
problem reformulation.  Using Yin’s case study classifications as a basis, the 
categorization of the post-merger culture change study is a descriptive study of multiple 
cases. 
Inquiry Strategy 
 Inquiry Strategy Selection 
 
 Qualitative researchers have a variety of inquiry strategies to select from.  
Glatthorn (1998)identifies four as: (1) ethnographic, (2) historical, (3) psychological and 
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(4) sociological.  Rudestam and Newton (2001) prefer to describe three qualitative 
research possibilities: (1) taking a holistic view (suspecting that the whole is different 
than the sum of its parts, (2) adopting an inductive approach where the researcher begins 
with a specific observation and moves towards the development of a general pattern, and 
(3) employment of naturalistic inquiry which refers to discovery in the natural 
environment versus in a controlled experiment. Creswell (1998) asserts that there are five 
possibilities – traditions, as he calls them – of inquiry strategy: (1) narrative, (2) 
phenomenology, (3) ethnography, (4) case study, and (5) grounded theory.  Since 
Creswell’s five traditions encompass those by Glatthorn and the Rudestam & Newton, 
they are described below. 
Narrative Inquiry Strategy 
 Described as when a researcher studies the lives of individuals and asks some of 
the participants to provide stories about their lives.  The information is reformatted into a 
narrative chronology. 
Phenomenology 
 Involves the study of the experiences subjects have as a result of a certain 
phenomenon.  Typically involve a small number of subjects during a lengthy 
engagement.    
Ethnography 
 Research wherein a cultural group is studied in their natural setting over a 
prolonged period of time.  Relies predominantly on observational data collection.  




This tradition often makes use of interviews, journals, and participant 
observations in order to derive a general theory of an action or an interaction grounded in 
the views of the participants. Involves the constant comparison of data following multiple 
stages of data collection. 
Case Study Discussion 
 Defined as the in-depth study of a program, an event, an activity, a process, or one 
or more individuals (Creswell, 1998).  It is not uncommon to employ a variety of data 
collection procedures for the development of a case study. 
  The strength of case studies is their detail, their complexity, and their use of  
multiple sources to obtain multiple perspectives.  The result is the thickness of  
description that allows the reader to interpret and decide the applicability of case  
learnings to another setting. (Rossman & Rallis, 2003, p. 105) 
Based on these descriptions of suitability, the case study format was selected as 
the most appropriate research inquiry strategy for the post-merger culture change 
dissertation.  This is so for three reasons. First, the varied techniques the three 
organizations utilized were explored in depth.  An attempt was made to establish if the 
steps the organizations took were pre-meditated or simply casual.  Perceived success and 
post-merger culture change duration was studied as well.  Second, since the case study is 
the method of choice when the phenomenon under study is not easily distinguished from 
its context (Yin, 1993), it was most appropriate here because of the expected complex 
interaction between the post-merger culture change phenomenon and the various 
constituencies.  Finally, the researcher’s intent with the post-merger culture change study 
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is to offer readers an opportunity to apply the lessons learned in these three cases to 
another population, This is what Rossman and Rallis refer to as “…reasoning by 
analogy…” (p. 105).  Since the post-merger culture change study is a qualitative case 
study, the research questions used were open-ended and evolutionary as the study 
continued.  
Data Collection Procedures 
Research Methodology 
 Three forms of data collection were utilized during this research.  They were 
interviews, observations and document review.  Each of these data collection types has 
unique options, advantages and limitations. 
Interviews 
 Three types of interviews were utilized in this qualitative study: (1) Face-to-face, 
one-on-one, in-person interviews, (2) Telephone interviews, and, (3) Group interviews.  
Interviews are useful because they give the participants an opportunity to provide 
historical information while they allow the researcher a degree of control over the line of 
questioning.  Limitations to interviews are that they provide information that is filtered 
thought the views of the participant.  Also, since people are not equally articulate and 
perceptive, the content of their contributions may be varied. 
For the post-merger culture change study, information was sought during 
structured interviews of selected executives, managers, line and staff employees of Dollar 
Rent A Car, Thrifty Car Rental, Union Pacific, and Southern Pacific.  The employment 
status of these workers was active, retired or terminated.  The detection of information 
trends in any of these groups caused the evolution of a line of questions intended to 
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segment the perceptions of the particular group.  Questions used in the interviews were 
open-ended and designed to prompt discussion and conversation.  This information from 
some interviews was audio recorded and transcribed shortly afterwards. As was discussed 
earlier, these interviews were conducted at or near the site of the merger and at field 
locations where affected employees conduct their work. To conserve research expenses, 
some of these interviews were telephonic rather than in-person. 
Observations 
 Several different combinations of types of observation exist based on whether the 
observer’s role is concealed or not and based whether the participant is the observer or 
not (Creswell, 2003).  The advantages to collecting data through observation are: first, the 
information is recorded as it is revealed.  It is not experienced and recalled later. Second, 
it allows for any unusual aspects to be recorded during observation. Finally, it may be 
useful in exploring topics that may be uncomfortable for participants to discuss.  The 
success of the observation form of data collection is based on the attendance and 
observational skills of the researcher.  Additionally, the researcher may be seen as 
intrusive which might limit access to observable information. 
 Since one of the mergers being studied is the researcher’s company (see the 
section below on concerns with Backyarding) personal unstructured observations with the 
in-process post-merger culture change were made and incorporated into the case study. 
These observations of behavior and activities were recorded as field notes.  Access to the 
pre-merger heritage workplaces and employee pods was available lending itself to 
abundant observational opportunities. 
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 The researcher in the post-merger culture change study purchased a quantity of 
common stock in both companies ( New York Stock Exchange symbols DTG and UNP,) 
in order to have access to each organization’s Annual Shareholder meeting and quarterly 
earnings calls for an additional opportunity to observe the corporate atmosphere. 
Document Review 
 A review of public and internal documents enabled the researcher to obtain the 
language and words or the participants.  Additionally, the collection of these was 
conveniently and unobtrusively pursued.  The limitations of this type of research are that 
some of the data may be protected and unavailable to public access. 
One of the studied organizations is very large and is reported on in the media 
regularly.  In 2004, Union Pacific became the 288th largest company in the world.  
Because of this, there was a bountiful supply of public documents available for 
incorporation into the case study.  These materials were in the form of stock offering 
circulars, books, newspaper and trade journal articles, and public records of meetings and 
negotiations.  Limited access to Union Pacific historical information was made through 
the Union Pacific Museum in Council Bluffs, Iowa, and through contacts at the Union 
Pacific Historical Society. 
 Documents examined from the Dollar Thrifty merger included the strategic plan, 





 Creswell (1998) recommends that a researcher reduce the entire case study to a 
single overarching question and several sub questions.  One model for conceptualizing 
the subquestions is to present them in two sets: (1) issue subquestions, and (2) topical 
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subquestions (Stake, 1995).  Issue subquestions address the major concerns to be 
resolved.  Topical subquestions anticipate the need for information and can actually 
become the template for data collection, data analysis, and narrative format construction. 
Rudestam and Newton (2001) concur. The primary question is usually followed by a 
series of further questions that have direct implication for data analysis. 
 Rossman and Rallis (2003) agree and are more descriptive regarding the follow-
up questions.  They recommend framing the study as responding to one or two general 
questions with three to five subquestions to refine the general ones. Important 
considerations are that questions should be non-directional.  That is, they should not 
imply cause and effect or suggest measurement and they should be worded in such a way 
that yes or no answers are avoided. Questions asking about “… impact, influence, or 
amount are quantitative questions masquerading as qualitative ones” (Rossman & Rallis, 
2003, p. 131) and should also be avoided. 
Research Questions Specific to This Study 
 The objective of the post-merger culture change study was the development of 
two themes:  intent and consequence.  Specifically, What steps did the organization take 
to manage the post-merger corporate culture? And, What was the effect of their endeavor 
on the organization? With this as a basis, two primary questions each, with two issue and 
two topical subquestions were developed and appear below in Figure 6. 
 To ensure that all participants have a common understanding of the topic, an 
explicit definition of corporate culture was presented at the start of the interview.  
Additionally, the respondents were asked what the merger meant to them.  For example, 
was it a take-over, a combination of equals, or a financial buy-out? 
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Sources of Data 
 
Sampling Strategy  
Interview participants.  A substantial portion of the post-merger culture change 
case study content was derived from personal one-on-one interviews with present and 
past employees of the four merger participants.  As stated above, the purpose of the 
research is to determine the company’s intent regarding the management of post-merger 
corporate culture and perceived success of their efforts.  To facilitate this, participants 
were from employee groups that were either part of the design of the post-merger culture 
Figure 5.  Post-merger culture change study interview questions. 
P. M. C. C. STUDY INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
(Start by providing a definition of corporate culture to the participant.) 
Primary Question How were the cultures of both companies different before the merger? 
 
Issue Sub questions • How did the acquiring company determine that a culture change was 
necessary? 
• How did the acquiring company decide on what the desired culture of 
the new company should be? 
 
Topical Sub questions 
 
• How would you describe the attitudes, values, beliefs and motivations 
of the people in your company before the merger? 
 
 
Primary Question What steps did the acquiring company take to change the culture of either 
company after the merger? 
Issue Sub questions • How long after the process started did it take to see a change in 
employee attitudes, values, and beliefs 
• Why do the employees feel or not feel that the culture change was an 
appropriate undertaking? 
Topical Sub questions 
 
• How would you describe everyone’s attitudes and values after the 
merger? 
• What visible objects are in place that attests to the post-merger culture? 
• What consequences to the culture change effort were there that other 
companies should be aware of? 





change or were affected by it.  For that reason, it was important that executives, 
managers, line employees and staff employees all were included in the sample.  Table 5 
illustrates the number of subjects from each company in each employment group who 
were interviewed.   Rossman and Rallis refer to this maximum variation style as 
“…stratified purposeful sampling…” (p. 138) as opposed to stratified random sampling. 
Opportunistic Interviews 
 Creswell (1998) refers to opportunistic sampling as the practice of following new 
leads and taking advantage of the unexpected.   As anticipated, as relationships were 
built, the participants listed in Table 5 referred the researcher to other interview 
participants with either post-merger culture change intent or success experience. 
Recruitment Procedures 
A two-step process was employed to recruit interview participants when the participants 
were not known.   Step One was to notify potential participants that a study of corporate 
culture is being undertaken. This notification was made by email or in person to 
employees of the Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group.  It was done at the Union Pacific 
Railroad through personal contacts. Interested parties were directed to contact the 
researcher for additional information.  Step Two was to pre-qualify each interested party, 
if unknown, with a brief qualifier questionnaire.  The purpose of this document was to 
establish the respondent’s position with the company, tenure, and predecessor company 
heritage.  This also provided an opportunity to distribute the necessary Institutional 
Review Board consent forms.  An example of the qualifier questionnaire is displayed as 
Figure 6. Based on the information contained in the qualifier questionnaire, the volunteer 





















Dollar Rent A Car Executives  Note 2 2 0 2 n/a 
Dollar Rent A Car Managers  Note 3 2 1 1 0 
Dollar Rent A Car Employees 3 1 1 1 
Thrifty Car Rental Executives Note 2 2 0 2 n/a 
Thrifty Car Rental Managers Note 3 1 0 1 n/a 
Thrifty Car Rental Employees 2 0 2 0 
   Total Dollar Thrifty 12 2 9 1 
     
Union Pacific Executives  Note 2 3 0  3 n/a 
Union Pacific Management Note 3 3 0 3 0 
Union Pacific Line/Staff Employees 2 0 1 1 
Southern Pacific Executives Note 2 0 0 0 n/a 
Southern Pacific Management Note 3 1 0 1 0 
Southern Pacific Line/Staff Employees 2 0 2 n/a 
   Total Union Pacific  11 0 10 1 
     
Total 23 2 19 2 
Note 1.  Length of service as of the date of the merger 
Note 2.  Officers of the corporation who were involved with the merger will be sought 




 The data from which the case studies were written came from three sources: 
interviews, observations and the review of documents.  The recording of the data 
collected is described as having two dimensions: fidelity and structure (Rudestam & 
Newton, 2001).  For example, an open-ended interview, when properly recorded, is 
described as having high fidelity and low structure.  Information collected from 
standardized pen and paper surveys, however, are characterized as having high fidelity 






Figure 6. Qualifier questionnaire. 
 
Thank you for your interest in my Ph.D. post-merger corporate culture research study.  Please take a 
moment to complete the following questions about yourself.  When done, simply return the form in the 
enclosed envelope. I will contact you shortly thereafter. 
Thank you!  
Jim Senese 
18415 South Old Highway 88 
Claremore, OK   74017-1387 
 












The company I worked for 
before the merger 
 Dollar Rent 
A Car 
  Southern Pacific 
Lines 
  
 Thrifty Car 
Rental 





My position at the time of the 
merger 
 Line Employee (with 
customer contact) 
  Staff Management 
 Staff Employee (supports 
line employees) 
  Executive / Officer 
 Line Management   Other: 
  
  
Length of service at the time 
of the merger 
 
 Less than five years of service 
 More than five years of service 
 Joined the company after the merger  
  
My current employment status  Actively employed by the merged company 
 Left and currently working somewhere else 
 Between jobs 
 Retired  
  
Included with this brief survey is some important information from the University of Oklahoma 






The techniques that were employed to record the collected data in the post-merger culture 
change study are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6 
 









Conduct and audiotape 
structured open-ended 
interviews  
Gather observational notes as a 
participant 
Analyze public documents 
Enter data into  
Microsoft Word 
Gather observational notes as an 
observer 
Continue to expand the literature 
review of trade publications 
 Collect samples/photographs of 
artifacts 
 
 Maintain a document file or 
record observations in a journal 
Maintain a document file or 
record observations in a journal 
 




 Rossman and Rallis (2003) describe the analysis and interpretation process as 
having three components.    The first is the systematic organization of the materials into 
salient themes and patterns, followed by bringing meaning to the themes, and finally 
converting it to a narrative that others can read and understand.  The same researchers say 
that the analysis actually starts at the same time the study is designed,  the conceptual 
framework, research questions, and research design “…all provide preliminary 
foreshadowing of the analysis” (Rossman & Rallis, 2003, p. 270). 
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 Stake (1995) refers to four forms of data analysis and interpretation in case study 
research.  In categorical aggregation, the researcher collects a series of instances from 
the data and hopes that issue-relevant meanings will emerge.  The direct interpretation 
approach involves the drawing of meaning from a single instance.  The third approach, 
naturalistic generalization, involves the creation of generalizations that others can apply 
to a population of cases.  The fourth form of data analysis is simply called patterns where 
the researcher looks for apparent relationships between two or more categories of data.  
Since this dissertation is a qualitative study of two specific mergers in the transportation 
industry, the research questions orient to cases or phenomena seeking patterns of 
expected and unexpected relationships, the approach that seems most appropriate is direct 
interpretation 
Validity 
 “Validity does not carry the same connotations as it does in quantitative research, 
nor is it a companion of reliability … reliability and generalizability play a minor role in 
qualitative inquiry” (Creswell, 2003, p. 195).  He continues to say that validity is a 
strength of this type of research. 
According to Rudestam and Newton (2001), qualitative researchers have 
developed their own language to describe reliability, internal validity, and external 
validity.  To these, the important considerations are the trustworthiness of the design as 
well as the audit ability (reliability), credibility (internal validity) and fittingness (external 
validity).  Other terms frequently used by qualitative researchers are: Criteria of 
Adequacy which refers to having enough data to make accurate conclusions; 
Appropriateness of Data means that information has been chosen purposefully to meet 
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the needs of the study; and Audit Trail refers to keeping a record of the process of the 
study so others can replicate the steps and reach the same conclusions. 
 A case study, as viewed by Stake (1995) requires extensive verification.  He 
refers to two procedural concepts: triangulation and member checking. Triangulation 
“…searches for the convergence of information…” (p. 213) and member checking is the 
validation that each participant concurs with how his or her comments were recorded.  He 
concedes, however, that member checking – which is done after the data are collected – 
usually results in few responses from the participants.  In lieu of this, Stake (1995) 
recommends a 20 criteria checklist for assessing a good case study report (p. 131). 
Figure 7.  Stake’s checklist for assessing a good case study report. 
 1. Is the report easy to read? 
 2. Does it fit together, each sentence contributing to the whole? 
 3. Does the report have a conceptual structure (i.e. themes or issues)? 
 4. Are its issues developed in a serious and scholarly way? 
 5. Is the case adequately defined? 
 6. Is there a sense of story to the presentation? 
 7. Is the reader provided some vicarious experience? 
 8. Have quotations been used effectively? 
 9. Are headings, figures, artifacts, appendixes, and indexes used effectively? 
 10. Was it edited well, then again with a last minute polish? 
 11. Has the writer made sound assertions, neither over nor under-interpreting? 
 12. Has adequate attention been paid to various contexts? 
 13. Were sufficient raw data presented? 
 14. Were data sources well chosen and I n sufficient number? 
 15. Do observations and interpretations appear to have been triangulated? 
 16. Is the role and point of view of the researcher nicely apparent? 
 17 Is the nature of the intended audience apparent? 
 18. Is empathy shown for all sides? 
 19. Are personal intentions examined? 
 20. Does it appear that individuals were put at risk? 
 





Stake’s checklist appears to be a sound approach because it address several traditional 
categories of validity, including: Face validity which refers to content that looks like it is 
appropriate for the purpose at hand; Content Validity which speaks to how well the 
content samples the universe relevant to the construct or behavior being assessed; 
Construct Validity which refers to instruments whose scores have been found to 
enter relationships required by the theory; Convergent Validity, other ways of assessing 
the same behavior or construct; and, Discriminative Validity that exists if content has 
been shown to produce expected differences between groups (Cone, 2001). 
Interpretation 
Rossman and Rallis (2003) caution qualitative researchers that as they put  
forward their interpretations they have to challenge the patterns that seem very apparent. 
“Alternative understandings always exist; you will need to search for, identify and 
describe them and then demonstrate how your interpretation is sound, logical and 
grounded in the data” (Rossman & Rallis, 2003, p. 289). 
Qualitative Narrative 
 According to Creswell (1998), some case studies generate theory, some are 
simply descriptions of cases, and others are analytical cross-case examinations.  Despite 
these differences, Stake (1995) prescribes a general format for the narrative to follow. His 
concept: (1) Open with a vignette so that the reader can develop a vicarious experience to 
get a time and place for the study; (2) Identify the issue, the purpose, and the method of 
the study; (3) Provide an extensive description of the case and its context; (4) List issues 
found so that the reader can understand the complexity of the case; (5) Probe the issues 
bringing-in confirmation and denial evidence; (6) Provide what is understood from the 
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case and if it challenges or confirms naturalistic generalizations or personal experiences; 
(7) Close by reminding the reader that this is one person’s encounter with a complex 
case. 
In this post-merger culture change dissertation, the narrative approach is a case 
study description of each of the two mergers using Stake’s template.  In addition, the 
experiences of each company was compared and contrasted to the other two and also 
compared with theories and the general literature on the topic. A template that this 
narrative follows is shown in Figure 8. 
Potential Limitations of the Study 
Guarded Information 
 For reasons of confidentiality (or embarrassment) many corporations guard their 
inner constructs – even the non-financial ones. 
 Figure 8.  P. M. C. C. narrative template. 
Vignette 
Issue, purpose, method of the study 
Extensive description of the case and its context 
List issues to illustrate complexity 
Probe the issues bringing-in confirmation or denial 
Provide what is understood from the case.  Describe 
contradictions to naturalistic generalizations. 
Close 
 
Officers and employees of some companies may not be willing to share their 
opinions and observations about the deep seated values of their company (with concern 
of reprisal).  Conversely, there may be a tendency to boast of and inflate the description 
of their company culture to be something greater than it really is – or to denigrate the 
culture of the other company in the merger. 
  75
  
Retort to guarded information. To mitigate this potential limitation, a guarantee of 
anonymity was provided.  Additionally, retired employees were sought who have less to 
protect than current employees. 
Donna Lu Gough, in her case study of the Matushita Electric Industrial Company 
(Gough, 2002) had a similar problem.  Although she made several direct requests for 
interviews, the public information office at Matsushita never returned her phone calls or 
responded to her written requests.  Being unable to conduct interviews she turned to 
secondary sources. 
Sample Not Large Enough to be Conclusive 
Critics may suggest that a two case study sample is too small to be conclusive and 
replicable for other merger considerations.  Additionally, critics may question the choice 
of these two particular mergers as case studies. 
Response to size of sample.  This research is not intended to be prescriptive of 
how corporate culture in the transportation industry will always be affected by the merger 
of two competitors.  Instead it a device that will assist others contemplating a merger to 
draw learnings from.  Nevertheless, the observations made from this study can be applied 
to other industries – especially in the transportation and service sectors. 
“Backyarding” 
This term refers to studying a site or people with which the researcher has a 
vested interest.  Glesne and Peshkin (1992) question research that examines “…your own 
backyard – within your own institution or agency or among friends or colleagues” (p. 21).  
Qualitative research is often attractive because of the easy access to participants and 
information at minimal cost (Creswell, 1998).  Nevertheless, according to Glesne and 
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Peshkin, the hazards include establishing expectations of data collection that may 
severely compromise the value of the data.  Also, individuals may provide information 
that they think the researcher wants to hear.  Since part of the post-merger culture change 
study is backyard work, it will be vital to remain objective and be cognizant and guard 
against the potential pitfalls.  It is also felt that the negative effect of Backyarding will be 
mitigated by the conscious application of Stake’s checklist for assessing a good case 
study report as shown previously in this chapter. 
Researcher’s Role 
 
Privacy and Confidentiality 
 All participants are anonymous and confidential.  The identity of all participants 
who are either actively employed or previously employed has been concealed. 
Deception and Consent 
Participation in this research was voluntary and participants were not deceived 
about the nature of the study. 
Trust and Betrayal 
Since qualitative research involves building a close relationship with the people 
being interviewed, consideration was given to the matter of trust. 
IRB Approval 
 
 All University of Oklahoma Institutional Review Board requirements have been 
followed including the mandatory online training program and the annual retraining and 
retesting process. 
Chapter Summary 
 This research took the form of two case studies that describe the intent, the 
consequences and the perceived effectiveness of the different post-merger culture change 
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approaches used in the subject mergers. To satisfy the criteria established by Rossman 
and Rallis, the research was conducted in the natural setting – in this case Omaha and 
Tulsa – and employed multiple methods of data collection. 
 The primary form of data collection was 20 personal one-on-one interviews with 
employees selected from a range of positions including executive, management, line and 
staff. The interviews were supplemented by researcher observations and by examination 
of public documents, books, journals, and trade periodicals associated with the mergers 
and culture changes. 
 A review of qualitative research literature provided consensus from a number of 
authors on the construct of the interview questions.  All prescribed a small number of 
overarching questions that are open-ended and probing. These were followed-up by issue 
and topical sub-questions. 
 A sampling strategy was been developed that identifies the number, work 
position, and tenure of people who were interviewed.  Qualifier questionnaires were 
utilized to establish the pool of candidates.  As expected, initial participants 
recommended additional interview subjects. 
 Since validity and reliability carry different connotations in qualitative research 
than in quantitative studies, Stake’s Checklist for Assessing a Good Case Study Report 
was used to validate the trustworthiness of the research design, as well as the credibility 
and fittingness of the findings. 
 Ethics, privacy, confidentiality, trust and betrayal have all been considered and 
were accounted for, as were all the relevant requirements of the University of Oklahoma 






Special Note Regarding Confidentiality 
 Assurances were made to the interviewees of the following case studies that their 
identities would be concealed.  For that reason, references in this chapter as shown as 
(DTG1) to (DTG12) and (UP1) to (UP11).  These designators have been purposely 
rearranged and do not follow in sequence to the listing in Table 5. 
Case One:  Dollar Rent A Car and Thrifty Car Rental 
Vignette 
 Two automobile rental companies that got their start seven years apart became 
fierce rivals for the same customer base across the United States.  One company, Thrifty, 
was a franchisor granting licenses to operate in cities and airports nationwide.  The other, 
Dollar, became a corporate operations based firm with a smaller number of licensees.  By 
1990, both companies had been acquired by the Chrysler Corporation and were 
headquartered in Tulsa, Oklahoma.  Twelve years later the independent companies 
merged and began operations as a single company with two brands.  Senior management 
anticipated merger problems due to a clash of the heritage company’s individual 







Issues, Purpose and Method of Study 
In a transaction that was described as a merger of equals, these two companies with 
dramatically different cultures were joined. Senior management actively sought to design 
and develop a post-merger culture that represented the best of both companies 
Table 7 
Dollar and Thrifty Historical Milestones 
Date Milestone 




September 22, 1965 Dollar [a Day] Rent A Car founded 
 
1985 Thrifty acquired by Chrysler Corporation 
 
August, 1990 Dollar acquired by Chrysler Corporation 
 
January, 1993 Dollar and General Rent A Car merge 
 
December, 1997 Chrysler spins Dollar and Thrifty in $461  
 




December, 2002 Dollar and Thrifty Merge. Operating now as a  
 
single company with two brands 
 
October, 2003 Gary L. Paxton named DTG President and CEO 
 
February 13, 2004 VET Culture Change Initiative Announced 
 
 
before the merger.  Attributes of the post-merger culture management process were 
learned through interviews with employees, managers and officers of both companies.  
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This information has been supplemented by personal observations and by examination of 
company records related to the culture change initiative.  The case starts with a 
description of the culture at both companies based on interview using the Harrison and 
Stokes (1992) identifiers. 
Description of the Case and Its Context 
Dollar Rent A Car, a company with a power culture joined forces with a slightly 
smaller company Thrifty Car Rental, characterized as having a support orientation.  
These designations are based on descriptors identified by Harrison and Stokes in 1992 
and established in group interviews of Dollar Thrifty subjects.  Dollar’s leader was only 
the company’s second Chief Executive Officer since the company was founded in 1965.   
The direction of the company has been this person’s vision for the last 16 years.  His 
leadership is based on strength, justice, and paternalistic benevolence.  Thrifty’s culture 
could be defined as being based on mutual trust between the individual and the 
corporation.  There were descriptions of organizational warmth and people centricity at 
Thrifty versus descriptors of goal achievement, waste reduction, and expanded spans of 
control at Dollar (DTG2, 4, 9, 12).   After two years of intense post-merger culture 
change activities, the results are very satisfying.  Traces of the two cultures still exist but 
the variations are considered inconsequential by senior management.  Prior to the merger, 
Dollar was characterized as having a task oriented power culture and Thrifty as having a 
relationship culture.  Both cultures worked well for the heritage companies and 
contributed to their success.  Today, with corporate operations and headquarters support 
services of both companies combined, some elements of the task/power culture remain at 
field locations of both brands while the relationship/person/support culture is now strong 
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at the combined corporate headquarters (DTG4, 8). Change at headquarters was faster 
because the ex-Dollar employees eagerly accepted some of the people centricity that the 
Thrifty organization enjoyed (DTG5).  Change at the field locations is slower for two 
reasons:  (1) corporate field operations of both brands is heavily dominated by ex-Dollar 
managers and employees; (2) the corporate operations division of the company is driven 
by a very successful rewards-based sales and expense control culture (DTG1, 3).  As 
such, the field employees – more than the headquarters employees – earn extra 
compensation by achieving targets, making sales, and controlling expenses.   
Nevertheless, icons and artifacts of the desired culture are evident at field locations and 
that group of employees is also enjoying the benefits of people centricity.  As Kotter and 
Heskett revealed in 1992, even though visible behavior norms have been proclaimed and 
displayed, some shared cultural values are invisible and slower to change. 
Dollar Rent A Car 
Pre-merger, Dollar employees felt that their number one priority was to follow the 
boss’ instructions and to get the job done.  They were motivated by the prospect of 
incentives and the fear of punishment. A “good” employee obeyed the boss without 
question and relationships between departments at Dollar headquarters were somewhat 
indifferent (DTG12).  At field locations, relationships between the quasi-autonomous 
profit centers were very competitive and are still so today (DTG2).  The monthly Peer-
Ranking Report of quantitative performance measurements was and is a prime motivator. 
At Dollar, pre-merger, it was vital for new employees to know political coalitions and 
where the money was made within the company.  There is no question that headquarters 
is an expense and existed solely to support the field (DTG2).  The dominant management 
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style in the field and at headquarters was authoritarian, characterized by Type A location 
managers who got their promotions by making the numbers, mimicking their boss’ style, 
and maximizing productivity.  Relationships between field managers and their staffs were 
important to the extent that hourly employees should be treated just well enough to be 
complacent and to not desire union representation (DTG5). 
A senior executive described being aligned with the Dollar brand’s mission of 
being the industry’s low-cost producer as being at the core of his company before the 
merger.  He described the company’s focus as “Building profits through utilization.  
Dollar is a company with a strong process orientation but still open to experimentation.  
No lack of analysis” (DTG2)  Long-term employees said that pre-merger Dollar allowed 
disagreement in individual situations, but overall provided little freedom to disagree. The 
mantra of productivity was that there’s no comp time at Dollar.  If someone got back 
from a business trip late in the evening they were still expected to be at the office early 
the next morning. Despite sounding like an impersonal company, Dollar employees were 
generally satisfied with their employment and felt that it was a good place to work 
(DTG5). 
Another senior executive worked for both Dollar and Thrifty over the span of his 
car rental industry career.  He said that the moment in Dollar’s history that defined it’s 
corporate culture was in 1994 when the company was operating in the red and coming 
close to extinction.  The employees of the company bonded in a turnaround project 
known as the Turning Point.  Together they found and eliminated waste, reduced 
expenses, and identified new sources of revenue.  They feel that they saved the company 
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and “…just like soldiers they never forget their war buddies” (DTG8).  That bond and the 
focus on cost savings defined the company’s culture. 
Thrifty Car Rental 
 Prior to the merger, Thrifty had very few corporate field operation locations.  
Most field locations were franchised and governed by licensee agreements.  As such, 
Thrifty headquarters existed to provide marketing, fleet services, insurance and other 
support to the licensees (known internally as Team Owners).  Not being an operating 
company, Thrifty headquarters employees felt that their most valuable activity was 
providing service, improving sales, encouraging franchise growth, cooperating with and 
attending to the needs of the licensees and their fellow employees (DTG4).  Employees 
were referred to as being part of the family – as opposed to some Dollar employees who 
reported feeling more like they were treated as contract labor (DTG10).  Thrifty 
employees respected and felt committed to other team members.  A successful Thrifty 
employee typically provided superior service and got along well with everyone while still 
being interested in his or her own development (DTG8). Departments at Thrifty 
headquarters felt interlocked and interdependent and exhibited a high level of 
cooperation.  More than at Dollar, Thrifty employees frequently socialized after work and 
on weekends. 
 A high level executive of Thrifty said that soul was at the core of his company 
prior to the merger.  Recognition of purpose and elevation and reverence of the brand was 
paramount.  Insiders knew that the Thrifty brand was glorified and made to look bigger 
than it really was.  He said that they did this with “…tremendous conventions, first class 
television commercials, and classy signage” (DTG11).  It was vital to have the Thrifty 
  84
  
employees take pride in their brand.  The company’s focus was growth and revenue.  The 
atmosphere at headquarters was characterized as spontaneous.  “Things could happen on 
a moment’s notice – especially rewards and recognition” according to this senior 
executive. “It was an exciting place to work.  You never knew what was going to happen 
next.”  “There was an element of fun.  People would dress in goofy costumes.  No reason 
to not have fun.  We went to great efforts to do this,” he continued. 
 Thrifty promoted dialogue and discourse.  People were encouraged to disagree.  It 
was an open environment.  Trust, hard work, high ethics and morals were keystone 
guiding principles. 
Which Culture Was Right? 
 According to the executives interviewed, they both were.  Dollar’s culture worked 
well for it and played a large part in the size and strength of the margin of this operating 
company.  Similarly, Thrifty’s culture was right for it, too, considering their primary 
function of being a franchisor and a provider of services to franchise owners. 
The Plan For Change 
 Senior executives were aware of the cultural variations and saw the need for a 
post-merger culture change while the merger was still being put together. The eleven-
member Executive Committee held a series of meetings starting on August 22, 2002, 
(with this researcher as facilitator) to address the pending culture clash.  At the first 
meeting – which also served as a tutorial on corporate culture – a Dollar executive raised 
the question of “What do we do about the perception of Dollar swallowing-up Thrifty?  
Another executive replied that communication was going to be key.  A top-level leader 
said that “Physical things can be done to demonstrate balance.  Team leaders should go 
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out of their way to hold meetings in the other building.  Everyone needs to get 
comfortable moving around each other’s world.”  With these words the cultural change 
process was initiated. ”The original Executive Committee was composed of six ex-Dollar 
executives and five ex-Thrifty executives.  The original Chief Executive Officer of the 
new company, Joseph E. Cappy, was a person with no heritage at either the Dollar or 
Thrifty brands but rather with the holding company that originally oversaw the operations 
of both companies when they were individual units of the Chrysler Corporation. 
 Three initial steps were taken to facilitate and accelerate Dollar Thrifty’s desired 
post–merger culture change.  They were: (1) a new mission, core values, and guiding 
principles were conceived that represented the best of both heritage companies.  
Programs enabling these guiding principles were funded, implemented, and promoted; (2) 
an easily recognizable cultural icon was created and heavily promoted; (3) a company-
wide group of cultural ambassadors was formed and trained to help promote the cultural 
initiative. According to company employees, each of these components contributed to the 
cultural initiative success. 
Mission, core values, guiding principles.  The foundation of the Dollar Thrifty 
post-merger culture change initiative was the declaration of a new mission, core values, 
and guiding principles that represented the best of the cultures of both heritage 
companies.  The process used to define these spanned a few days behind closed doors and 
consisted of the facilitator asking the eleven-member Executive Committee to define the 
values and principles they felt best represented the pre-merger companies.  Then, 
collectively, the team argued, bartered and finally agreed on which of these would be the 
desired values and principles of the new company.  Some of this discussion tied back to 
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an environmental analysis of internal strengths and weaknesses and external opportunities 
and threats performed by the same group a week earlier.  As part of this discussion, the 
team decided on a mission that would represent a sustainable competitive advantage and 
still be applicable to both external and internal customers. 
Dollar Thrifty mission. The criteria for the company mission was that it would 
state what the company stood for and be the mantra any employee could turn to when 
faced with a cultural decision.  It should be short, memorable, believable, and executable.  
The Dollar brand had a heritage of being a low-cost producer and followed the tenets of 
Michael Porter’s theory of having a competitive cost advantage (Porter, 1985).  Dollar 
had a history of cost containment at its field locations that was driven by an emphasis on 
fleet utilization, staff productivity requirements, lean workforce models, and hard-driven 
property and asset acquisition negotiations.  The Executive Committee clearly felt that 
this was a strength that was sustainable and that should make its way into the mission 
statement. 
The Thrifty brand had a heritage of providing memorable customer service to 
external and between internal customers (DTG1).  The dogma at Thrifty was that 
customer retention and customer loyalty was supreme.  Thrifty executives had a deep-
seated belief that exceptional customer service would drive customer loyalty and thus 
profitability.  It went further to include employee satisfaction and retention in the 
following way.  Senior management at Thrifty felt that satisfied employees were more 
likely to stay with the company (DTG5).  Because of their tenure, these skilled 
employees would provide good customer service that would drive customer retention.  
Satisfied customers would tell others about their experience and would have a likelihood 
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of considering Thrifty for a repeat transaction.  Since repeat customers are relying on 
their previous experiences, there is not as great of a need for marketing activities to get 
them to return (DTG7). 
Clearly, the Executive Committee wanted cost and service to be represented by 
the new company’s mission statement.  They agreed that customers make their buying 
decision based on two things: price and service (service includes convenience).  By 
definition, value is the word that represents the point where price and service meet.  To 
introduce the element of sustainability, the words every time were chosen. Senior 
leadership wanted to convey that the combination of price and service would be met with 
each and every transaction – despite that the car rental industry’s pricing is very dynamic 
and fluid.  The memorable mission statement that came out of this exercise was three 
simple words: Value Every Time. 
A living, breathing cultural icon. The Executive Committee decided to create an 
icon that would portray the company mission and become a rallying point.  They felt that 
the new company was tenacious in the marketplace but yet warm and friendly within the 
family (DTG11).  The icon that was agreed upon that had both of these traits was an 
English bulldog.  A search team found and purchased a living, photogenic, example of 
tenacity and warmth.  The one-year old bulldog was named VET (the initials of Value 
Every Time) and became the company mascot.  Today, VET appears on most internal 
documents including forms, paychecks, newsletters, recognition awards, Intranet screens, 
company casual wear and on banners and posters throughout headquarters and the field 
locations, VET has an “office” in one of the buildings on the Dollar Thrifty campus and 
can be reserved for departmental meetings and events by using Microsoft Outlook 
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meeting planner function.  New employees have their photographs taken with VET, as do 
graduating classes from the company’s leadership programs.  Dollar Thrifty provides 
food and health care for VET and he goes home each night with a designated employee-
keeper. 
Core values. As was the case with the mission statement, the Executive 
Committee chose to identify core values that were representative of the best of both 
predecessor companies.  The four core values were presented to the employee population 
as the cornerstones of the new company’s success.  The employees were told that all four 
values will be present in everything the company does – albeit not always equally.  The 
Dollar Thrifty core values as shown on the employee wallet cards are: (1) People. Our 
employees are the key to our success.  We will be a people-centric company. (2) 
Customers. Our passion is consistent service delivery to our customers.  (3) Continuous 
Improvement. In everything we do, we will never be satisfied with the status quo and we 
will always be willing to change. (4) Results.  We are results-driven.  The balance 
between the Dollar and the Thrifty predecessor cultures is shown in the above.  Thrifty 
executives influenced inclusion of the People and the Customer core values while 
Dollar’s executives drove for the Results and Continuous Improvement values. 
At first the Dollar Thrifty employees felt that being “people centric” and being 
“results” driven were in conflict.  At corporate headquarters the ex-Dollar employees 
very quickly adopted the ex-Thrifty core value of being people centric (DTG4).  They 
enjoyed the additional social events, recognition, personal benefits, training and 
development.  The company hired a wellness coordinator and a recognition administrator.  
A new fitness center was built and numerous rewards and recognition programs were 
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conceived and implemented.  It took the ex-Thrifty employees a little longer to appreciate 
the value of being results driven. 
Cultural ambassadors.  In any change endeavor, the employees who really get-it 
stand out from the rest. Cartwright and Cooper (1996) referred to these people as cultural 
informants.  Dollar Thrifty identified who those people were at headquarters and in the 
field and got them involved as apostles of the new culture.  These people were declared 
to be Field or Headquarters Cultural Ambassadors – a job that they performed in addition 
to their regular work.  They received training on how to portray the core values and 
guiding principles.  Originally, a balance between Dollar and Thrifty employees was 
sought.  However, as time went on that became moot.  The Ambassador’s function was to 
be role models of the culture that other employees could turn to for guidance and help 
whenever there was a potential cultural conflict.  The Ambassadors were trained in what 
types of instances would require HR Employee Relations intervention and what types 
they were free to get involved with.  Additionally, the Ambassadors would arrange 
ceremonies and participate in recognition celebration. 
It was reasoned that if the Ambassadors were such a success that additional 
apostles should be identified forming a network of Dollar Thrifty cultural advocates in 
every department at headquarters and every profit-center city in the field (DTG11).  At 
this writing there are 176 Cultural Ambassadors in the organization (1 for each 45 
employees). 
Ambassadors serve a life sentence.  Once an Ambassador, a person is an 
Ambassador for the rest of their career.  In reality, an Ambassador becomes an alumnus 
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after two years and continues to receive correspondence and meeting summaries for the 
balance of their employment. 
A perceived miss-step.   When the new Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group structure 
was introduced on December 3, 2002, Joseph E. Cappy, CEO, announced that the 
company would be lead by Co-Presidents.  These men were Gary L. Paxton, ex-head of 
Dollar and Don Himelfarb, ex-head of Thrifty.  Although it wasn’t discussed with the 
rank and file, it was anticipated that the joint leadership would have several benefits 
including the cross pollination of values, a symbol of unity for the employees of both 
heritage companies, and an opportunity for Cappy to further evaluate who his successor 
should be when he retires. 
 Within a year, Cappy did retire and announced that Paxton would be his 
replacement.  Himelfarb became Chief Administrative and Cultural Officer. 
 The consensus among Dollar Thrifty headquarters employees was that if the 
intent of having co-presidents was to accelerate the cultural initiative it failed.  The 
employees read what was meant to display unity between the companies as a competition 
among presidents.  When Paxton got the position his supporters rallied while Himelfarb’s 
felt defeated.  What may have been intended as an accelerant turned out to simply delay 
the start of the culture change process. Don Himelfarb became the number two executive 
in the company with the title of Chief Administrative Officer. 
Other culture change elements. Himelfarb was one of the architects and a believer 
in the new culture and had enough organizational stature that all employees paid attention 
to him and heeded his directions.  He surrounded himself with highly effective people 
from Training, HR, Communications, and Operations and formed a steering committee 
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known as the Kennel Club (with obvious reference to VET, the living bulldog icon).  The 
Kennel Club installed a high volume of cultural artifacts, communications pieces and 
programs as shown in Figure 9.  In the first year, the company spent $360,000 on cultural 
artifacts (just under $50 per employee).  Everything was branded with VET’s picture, his 
paw print or the words Value Every Time.  The size, page count, and frequency of the 
company newsletter were increased.  Special editions were published to celebrate tenure 
awards or customer service excellence awards. 
The Training Department designed and developed management training called 
Leadership Week – which to date has been presented over thirty times to capacity  
Figure 9. Programs introduced at Dollar Thrifty to assist with culture change. 
People Centric Customer Satisfaction 
• Leadership Week training (30 
classes in two years. 
• Development programs tied to 
Emotional Intelligence training. 
• Hired a Recognition and Rewards 
Coordinator. 
• Numerous ongoing recognition 
programs and tools. 
• Hired a Wellness Coordinator. 
• Quarterly “fun” events. 
• Expansion of Cultural Ambassadors 
(number and roles). 
• Annual Employee Opinion Surveys 
administered by an outside vendor. 
• Employee stock purchase plan. 
• Creation of a Future Executives 
Development Program. 
• Expanded size and page count of 
the monthly employee newsletter. 
• Creation of the Office of Customer 
Advocacy. 
• VETline and VET emails to report 
cultural issues. 
• Linkage of Customer Satisfaction 
results to bonus plans. 
Continuous Improvement Results 
• Expansion of the Business Process 
Redesign Department, 
• VET Tips employee suggestion 
competition. 
• Continuation of the Profit sharing 
program. 





audiences from the Field and Headquarters.  A waiting list still exists for attendance 
(DTG12).  Additionally, the company enlisted the services of a noted consultant to 
present emotional intelligence (EQ) training as part of Leadership Week. This daylong 
segment is considered the pinnacle of the developmental program (although all of the 
other classes receive consistently high evaluations).  In the EQ program the Dollar 
Thrifty leaders receive help in improving their intrapersonal, interpersonal, stress 
management, and environmental skills. 
Emotional intelligence became the common theme for many other developmental 
programs ranging from EQ-360 assessments to officer coaching and career counseling. 
To support the Guiding Principle of recognizing achievement and celebrating 
success, the company hired a person to be their coordinator of recognition programs.  
This person designs and delivers company-wide recognition programs to headquarters 
and field employees. These include Employees of the Month, Unleashed Service, Mile 
Marker and other programs.  Her role includes training everyone to spot recognizable 
activities and offer spontaneous rewards.  To assist with this, the company provided 
Kudos Kits to every department and field office filled with logo items to use for 
spontaneous awards.  The contents of the Kudos Kits range in value from $125 to $275 
based on the population of the department.  One free refill per year is provided as an 
incentive to use the Kit and not let it sit idle in the manager’s office.  Additional refills 
are available at cost.  The recognition program became such a success that it was 




Complexity of Issues 
Although it seems like a potpourri of activities, the Dollar Thrifty post-merger 
culture change initiative actually follows many of the rites identified by Trice and Beyer 
in 1985 and shown in Table 8. 
Table 8 
 




Dollar Thrifty Application 
Rite of Passage Every new employee receives a 
comprehensive new hire orientation that is 
built around the company’s cultural theme 
(DTG6).  The cultural orientation for 
headquarters employees is a four-hour event.   
Rites of Degradation Cultural laggards were coached and mentored.  
When performance did not meet cultural 
standards a few people were dismissed. “We 
will carry the wounded but shoot the resistors” 
(Gary Paxton, personal communication). 
Rites of Enhancement Rewards and recognition have become an 
integral part of the Dollar Thrifty culture, as 
discussed above.  Similarly, wellness has 
become a theme driven by the company’s 
wellness coordinator. 
Rites of Renewal Organizational development activities 
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included culture training, more skills training, 
accessible on-line learning, Leadership Week, 
Emotional Intelligence training. 
Rites of Conflict Resolution The Human Resources Employee Relations 
group grew from a staff of four to a staff of 
ten in three years (DTG5). 
Rites of Integration Regularly scheduled events are put on for 
headquarters and the field by Corporate 
Communications.  These include theme days 
like the Dog Days of Summer, ice cream days, 
and more.  In 2005, the employees supported 
an initiative to put the budget for all Holiday 
Parties into a fund that supported employee 
victims of Hurricane Katrina. 
 
To many within the organization, the success of the Dollar Thrifty culture change 
is due to a combination of continuity, persistence, and employing a range of techniques 
with a common objective. 
Confirmation or Denial of Success 
 An outside consultant who works with Dollar Thrifty employees said that some 
employees feel that the core value of being people-centric is at best aspirational.  Others 
disagree citing numerous programs, benefits and employee events (DTG2, 3, 10).  Using 
the definitions cited earlier, these perceptions may describe organizational climate more 
than corporate culture. 
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Most sources in the review of the literature indicate that change comes slowly 
taking time to permeate the organization.  At Dollar Thrifty, the change came faster than 
many expected due to two contributing factors: (1) it was guided by a high-ranking 
executive and driven by popular programs; and (2) there was a systematic approach 
towards installing a culture that replicated the best from both predecessor companies.  
 The success of the Dollar Thrifty culture change is best illustrated by this from 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers Feldman and Spratt. “Culture change is rooted in behavior 
change, reinforced by role models, stimulated by incentives, and supported by sensibly 
aligned policies” (Feldman & Spratt, 1999, p. 167). 
Challenges 
As of September 8, 2006, 62% of the Dollar Thrifty workforce has a hire date 
after January 1, 2003, the date of the merger. These employees do not have a heritage 
company to compare today’s culture to and they often wonder what the fuss is about 
regarding combining cultures.  The cultural challenge, today, has less to do with change 
and more to do with maintenance. 
Additionally, three cost control programs were recently announced that could 
affect the attitudes of the employee population.  One was the outsourcing of 300 
information technology jobs to a third-part firm.  The other is the declaration of all 
company property to be a non-smoking zone, and the third is the introduction of an third-
party audit to determine eligibility of group insurance dependents. 
 The outsourcing program initially raised questions of the company’s people 
centricity.  Executive management spent hours delivering the message that the program 
was necessary to ensure fitness of the company and the ability to address the needs of the 
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larger body of employees.  Their efforts appear to be effective.  Although the smokers are 
a loud population, they are a small one.  As expected, the October 1st ban on tobacco use 
anywhere on company property was not a cultural event (DTG7).  To show its 
commitment to people, Dollar Thrifty is offering smoking cessation assistance to the 25% 
of the workforce who still smoke.  This initiative and the dependent eligibility initiative 
are expected to save the company millions of dollars in health care costs. 
Case Two: 
  Common Control and Merger of the Southern Pacific Rail Corporation by the Union 
Pacific Corporation  
Historical Perspective 
 One hundred and twenty-seven years after their lines were linked as the basis of 
the first transcontinental railroad across America, two companies were merged forming 
the country’s largest railroad.  The 1996 acquisition of control of the Southern Pacific by 
the Union Pacific was actually their second merger attempt. The first, in 1901 was 
dissolved twelve years later when the U. S. Supreme Court declared the Union Pacific 
control of the Southern Pacific to be an illegal restraint of trade.  During this reverse-
merger process, “…the rivalry and distrust between the old Southern Pacific and Union 
Pacific managements bore its bitterest fruit” (Orsi, 2005, p. 38).  By the early 1980’s, the 
Southern Pacific had experienced several decades of falling traffic revenues, problematic 
investments in non-rail businesses, and disposal of assets to raise cash.  Finally, on 
September 11, 1996, the Southern Pacific lost its identity to the Union Pacific in a $3.9 





Historical Milestones Leading to the Union Pacific Acquisition of the Southern Pacific 
Date Milestone 
1862 and 1864 President Lincoln signed the Pacific Railroad Acts of 
1862 and 1864 directing the Union Pacific and the 
Central Pacific to construct a transcontinental railroad. 
1863 Central Pacific started building track eastward from 
Sacramento.  Union Pacific breaks ground in Omaha 
(although legislation specified Council Bluffs). Project 
delayed due to funding issues. 
1865 The first Union Pacific rail is laid in Omaha. 
May 10, 1869 Central Pacific and Union Pacific tracks meet at 
Promontory Summit, Utah.  Golden spike ceremony 
signified the joining of the nation by rail. 
1870 Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad is chartered by 
the people of Denver to express dissatisfaction with the 
Union Pacific leaving them off the main line and also to 
challenge the growth of the Santa Fe into their territory. 
1884 Southern Pacific Railroad formed.  Central Pacific 
brought under the SP umbrella. 
1893 Union Pacific falls into bankruptcy. 




1901 First UP-SP merger.  Union Pacific purchases 38% of 
Southern Pacific stock and assumes control of the 
railroad. 
1913 Union Pacific is ordered by the Supreme Court to sell its 
current 46% share of Southern Pacific and relinquish 
control. 
1969 The Union Pacific Corporation is established as a 
holding company.  The Union Pacific Railroad is one of 
its operating companies. 
1982 The Interstate Commerce Commission approved the 
merger of the Union Pacific, Western Pacific and 
Missouri Pacific. 
1988 Union Pacific acquires the Missouri-Kansas-Texas 
Railroad. 
1988 Rio Grande Industries acquires the Southern Pacific 
Railroad.  The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad 
and Southern Pacific are merged, retaining the Southern 
Pacific name. 
1995 The Union Pacific acquires the Chicago and North 
Western Railroad. 
August 3, 1995 Agreement reached for the acquisition of the Southern 




August 6, 1996 The United States Surface Transportation Board 
approves the common control and merger of the two rail 
carriers controlled by the Union Pacific Corporation and 
the Southern Pacific Rail Corporation.  Decision number 




Effective date of the Union Pacific – Southern Pacific 
merger. 
 
Note.  From Ambrose (2000), Athearn (1971), Kenefick (1985), Orsi (2005), Stover (1997), Union 
Pacific Museum, 
 
Similarities and Differences between the Two Railroads 
 
Similarities 
Both the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific Railroads are companies that played 
significant roles in the development of the western United States.  When the two railroads 
met in Promontory, Utah, forming the first transcontinental railroad, they collectively 
affected land settlement, industrial development, and agriculture throughout the west. 
At the time of the merger both companies were engaged in moving freight (not 
passengers) and competed aggressively for the same customers in several markets, 
notably Houston, New Orleans, Los Angeles, Oakland, and Salt Lake City. 
Differences 
The Southern Pacific had a unique history and character.  Their main competitor, 
the Union Pacific, also had a unique persona and history. The Union Pacific and Southern 
Pacific relationship with each other 140 years ago when they formed the first 
transcontinental railroad was less than harmonious and displayed different business 
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styles, modes of operation, and senses of purpose. For example, the federal government 
granted the railroads 6,400 acres of land and a 30-year loan of government bonds (valued 
at $16,000, $32,000 and $48,000 based on the difficulty of the terrain) for each mile they 
developed of the transcontinental route.  The Southern Pacific and the Union Pacific had 
different philosophies regarding the administration of that land.  The Southern Pacific 
preferred to subdivide and sell their grants to small-scale farmers, miners and loggers to 
encourage long-term settlement, economic growth and rail traffic.  The Union Pacific 
preferred to hold onto the land itself and extract, process, use or sell the resources.  The 
Southern Pacific position was based on future growth; the Union Pacific’s was based on 
harvesting the available resources. 
The Southern Pacific had a tradition of community because its corporate interest 
could be construed as public welfare. Dissimilarly, the Union Pacific has always 
considered itself to be an astute business organization with strong attitudes towards 
stakeholder return. 
Additionally, at the time of the merger, the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific 
had different operating practices.  The Union Pacific was “ … a well-capitalized, long-
haul, high-density railroad that takes big trains out of Chicago … and hauls them long 
distances to the West Coast and breaks them up” (Hoffman, 1998, Online).  The Southern 
Pacific, conversely, did a lot of terminal operations, industrial switching, and short-haul 
work. 
Southern Pacific Culture before the Merger 
 
In 1996 the Southern Pacific was a railroad with strong tendencies associated with 
an achievement (Harrison & Stokes, 1992) type of culture.  Organizations displaying this 
culture are characterized as having employees who feel they are empowered to find a 
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better way of doing things, have a strong commitment towards getting the job done, and 
are self-motivated and competent.  Ex-Southern Pacific employees reported that this 
described the attitudes and values of their company prior to the merger (UP2, UP11).  At 
their heritage company, the employees closest to the action often made field decisions.  
The perception was that Southern Pacific management respected the field operations 
crews and valued their experience and job savvy (UP1, UP9).  One employee (UP9) said 
that when he was hired in 1979, switchmen were using their skills to do the work fast yet 
still having control of their own pace. The values that Southern Pacific employees 
experienced in their work often facilitated personal advantage.  By using their initiative 
and creativity, Southern Pacific employees were sometimes able to do their work in less 
than the allotted time while being paid for working a full shift (UP10).  This translates to 
having a sense of control over their work processes that was facilitated by a sense of 
empowerment. 
Because of the often-remote assignments, railroad employees have to supervise 
themselves.  Southern Pacific employees had a strong tendency to do what was needed 
without direction from above (UP3).  Some Southern Pacific employees said that to get 
the job done, their crews often would be encouraged to devise work-arounds (UP1).  In 
most cases management knew that if the crews were left to their own devices the work 
would get accomplished because there was a sense of mission – to move the freight 
(UP1).  Employees who did not share the Southern Pacific’s basic values (and the mores 





Union Pacific Culture Before the Merger 
 According to field operating sources as well as senior Union Pacific management, 
the culture of the railroad in 1996 was previously defined by the 1982 acquisition of the 
Missouri Pacific (UP7).  This merger was nicknamed the “Mop-Up” (Kaufman, 1995, p. 
205) using both railroad initials to signify that it was mopping up all the available routes 
and business in that territory.  On September 13, 1982, when the Interstate Commerce 
Commission approved the merger of the Union Pacific and Missouri Pacific, the Union 
Pacific was the nation’s ninth largest railroad and the Missouri Pacific was the sixth 
largest.  The original plan was for both companies to remain autonomous, though 
coordinated, while maintaining the heritage company names (Miner, 1983).  Shortly after 
receiving government approval, however, a plan to use common officers for both 
companies was put into place.  Younger Missouri Pacific officers prevailed and 
eventually became the dominant power at the Union Pacific with the retirement of older 
Union Pacific officers. 
Union Pacific Culture from the Perspective of Southern Pacific Employees 
According to interviewed sources, the Missouri Pacific had a culture 
characterized by management by intimidation and confrontational relationships with the 
rank and file (UP2, UP9, UP10). One Union Pacific employee compared it to the old 
southern mentality of owners versus workers . A high-ranking manager said the 
leadership group was known as the “MoPac Mafia” (UP7).  Consistent with this, when 
the Union Pacific acquired the Southern Pacific, the employees experienced a clash 
between patterns of beliefs, values, and sentiments that were reflective of the Missouri 
Pacific power oriented culture (Harrison & Stokes, 1992) from fourteen years earlier. 
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This was difficult for the Southern Pacific employees because the power culture is based 
on inequality of access to resources.  “A resource can be anything one person controls 
that another person wants” (Harrison & Stokes, 1992, p. 14).  Cameron and Quinn (1999) 
refer to this as a hierarchy culture where the work is very formalized and structured and 
procedures govern what people do.  In this type of organization, formal rules and policies 
provide the predictability that management requires.  At its worst extreme, power type 
culture tends toward a rule by fear – which is how Southern Pacific operating employees 
interpreted the new culture they were faced with after the September 11, 1996, merger 
(UP2, UP3). 
How the Union Pacific perceived its own Culture  
 The Union Pacific Railroad, at the time of the Southern Pacific Railroad merger 
could be described as having a role oriented culture (Harrison & Stokes, 1992).  This 
culture continues to exist today.  Organizations with a role culture rely on a system of 
structures and procedures to give stability to the company and protection to the 
employees.  “…the job can still punish the unlucky or momentarily careless with 
amputation and death… “(Goepel, 2005, p.26).  Some similarities exist between role and 
power cultures, such as a clear definition of employee duties and limits to empowerment 
and discretionary authority. Absolute adherence is expected.  Some of these come from 
the collective bargaining agreements the Union Pacific has with fourteen different unions.  
Others come from published company rules, policies and procedures.  For example, one 
of the first documents distributed to new Union Pacific employees after the merger was a 
booklet on discipline called Upgrade Policy.  The initials appear to be intentional.  This 
document, rather than extend a welcome to the Union Pacific family, listed various rule 
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infractions, the level of severity, and the discipline that could be expected following a 
violation.  Rule violations resulted in demerits that accumulated and lead to termination 
of employment (UP10, UP11). 
The role-oriented culture is well suited for large organizations, like the Union 
Pacific, that have a wide dispersion of employees who are not directly supervised.  In 
2005, the Union Pacific moved 9.5 million revenue carloads of freight within its 33,000-
mile system.  The crews of the trains moving this freight across the 23 state service area 
are not directly supervised but are, rather, dispatched from a central dispatch center in 
Omaha, Nebraska.  Electronic devices including global positioning equipment and the 
railroad equivalent of airline “black boxes” monitor performance and conformance to the 
rules (UP5).  According to Jim Young, President and Chief Executive Officer, safety of 
the crews and the public is the Union Pacific’s number one priority (personal 
conversation).  The number two priority follows closely and is called velocity, a 
contemporary railroad term which is a composite index of several key metrics. 
Figure 10. Union Pacific Velocity Index Components. 
 
• Volume 
• Hours trains are held for resources 
• Inventory of freight cars 
• Terminal processes 
• Slow orders due to on-line events 
• Work events (maintenance) 
• Re-crew events 
• Incidents (accidents) and Impact 
 
 
From a leadership perspective, the role-oriented culture provides stability, justice 
and efficient performance.  From the standpoint of the affected employee at any 
company, the role-oriented culture, however, can be construed as intolerant, 
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disempowering, confrontational, intimidating, stifling, arrogant and a morale killer.  One 
Union Pacific engineer (UP1) defined his company as having less to do with satisfying 
customers and moving freight and more to do with following rules and being safe.  An 
ex-Southern Pacific conductor said that a simple setout move (leaving freight cars at a 
shipper) that used to take an hour now takes two hours because of the procedural and 
safety requirements (UP9). Mechanical failures, track problems, grade crossing incidents 
and other accidents cause delays, damage or death. According to one senior Union 
Pacific executive (UP5), there is no such thing as a minor incident when the railroad is 
running at capacity.  If a locomotive breaks down anywhere on the system it delays 12 – 
14 other trains within an hour. For that reason, devices are built into newer locomotives 
that notify the dispatch center by telemetry of changes in oil pressure or other potential 
causes of motor shutdown.  Additionally, personnel are on duty 24/7 in major cities and 
by radio to assist road crews with the diagnosis and restarting of today’s complex 
locomotives.  According to employees at all levels of the organization, the attitude of the 
senior management at the Union Pacific is that every accident can be prevented. Today, it 
is acknowledged that every incident is counted – even a paper cut by an office employee 
(UP6). 
Description of the Case and Its Context 
 The post-merger culture change approach taken by Union Pacific leadership when 
it assumed control of the Southern Pacific can be described as passive compared to Dollar 
Thrifty’s approach that actively sought to identify and adopt the best practices of each 
heritage company.  In the process of assimilating the Southern Pacific workforce, the 
Union Pacific either chose to discount or were not aware of the S. P.  achievement-
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oriented attitudes and beliefs. Rather than accept and adopt Southern Pacific operating 
practices, the Union Pacific offered S. P. middle managers and other employees’ 
separation packages (UP2). Slate, the online news magazine reported that this left Union 
Pacific people running unfamiliar Southern Pacific lines and equipment.  “This of course 
sounds like a dumb thing to do, but it is a fast if brutal way of dealing with different 
corporate cultures” (Surowiecki, 1997, online).  As parcel of this, all remaining 
employees were immediately bound by the operating rules and regulations of the new 
parent company. One ex-manager interviewed for this case said that the tragedy is that 
there are a lot of very good, capable and sincere people in the company that are 
hamstrung by oppressive administrative requirements (UP3). 
The Union Pacific’s Approach Toward Post-Merger Culture Change 
 The weakness of the role culture is its impersonality.  Employees who came to the 
Union Pacific from the Southern Pacific following the 1996 merger reported feeling this 
characteristic more than any other (UP3, UP10).  Depending on who is discussing it, 
perceptions abound in the Southern Pacific/Union Pacific culture clash.  For example, a 
Union Pacific official said that his railroad was cooperative because it made 
accommodations for the Southern Pacific employees and their engineer’s union contract 
(UP5).  From the other side, the Southern Pacific called the Union Pacific leadership 
stubborn and unwilling to listen to the senior employees (UP2). One employee said that it 
took more than a year to iron-out contract issues.  Regardless of heritage, employees of 
both companies reported having huge amounts of pride.  “The Southern Pacific people 
were accustomed to making do with very little.  The Union Pacific people were 
accustomed to having whatever they needed, on the double” (Saunders, 2003, p. 319).  
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The Union Pacific people were also very process-oriented, rules driven and safety-
conscious.  Kurt Hoffman (1998), in the online SupplyChainBrain.com, said that “The 
UP didn’t take advantage of the talent and knowledge at the SP” (Hoffman, 1998, 
online). 
 An unhealthy culture.  Using the conclusions drawn as a result of research by 
Kotter and Heskett in 1992, the Union Pacific displayed the characteristics of an 
organization with an unhealthy culture.  Union Pacific leadership was described in the 
press and by shippers as arrogant (UP8).  “The big thing about Union Pacific is that 
they’re arrogant” (Freeman, 2004, p. 69). To these customers, especially in Houston and 
along the Chemical Coast, the Union Pacific portrayed a company that acted as if it did 
not highly value their business (employees said that it probably did but the congestion 
sent a different message).  To the Ex-Southern Pacific employees, the Union Pacific 
attitude towards employees came across as hostile (UP1, UP9).  Two ex-Southern Pacific 
field employees said that pay items that were covered by contract were frequently 
disregarded forcing the filing of grievances (UP9, UP10). To them, the company behaved 
in a centralized bureaucratic way.  One employee said that following the merger Union 
Pacific leadership never even came to their terminal to introduce themselves or meet the 
employees.  “It was like something out of a wartime movie.  You would come to work 
one day and there would be leaflets and rule books scattered around like they were 
dropped from a plane overnight.  No explanation.  No personal contact” (UP10).  The 
challenge facing the Union Pacific was to develop a culture that would allow its specific 




 A year prior to the Southern Pacific merger, the Union Pacific had a meltdown 
experience following its purchase of the Chicago and North Western.   With this merger, 
the Union Pacific reduced employment, cut costs and changed operating practices.  The 
result was traffic snarl and very angry customers. It was only months after the Chicago 
and North Western problems that the Union Pacific reached an agreement to acquire the 
Southern Pacific. Playing a leading role in directing this was U. S. Vice President Dick 
Cheney who at the time was a Union Pacific director (Freeman, 2004). 
 At a public conference in July 2006, this researcher asked a Union Pacific officer 
if the company was able to identify and adopt any best practices from the railroads it 
merged with.  He said that most employees in his company had a tendency to want to 
impose their [my emphasis] practices on the railroads they acquired.  His division, 
however, made a concerted effort to seek best practices and did find some imitable 
practices with the Missouri Pacific, Western Pacific and Southern Pacific mergers mostly 
as it affected track engineering. 
Ever since the 1982 Missouri Pacific merger, the Union Pacific chose to establish 
its culture as the standard for its partners to acquire (UP3, UP8).  Other than the 
accommodations that were made to incorporate the union contracts of the acquired 
employee groups there were no reported attempts to acknowledge the Southern Pacific 
culture and no interest in changing the Union Pacific role culture to be more like the 
Southern Pacific achievement orientation. 
 Therefore, the post-merger culture change in the Union Pacific case study, simply 
consisted of activities intended to assimilate the attitudes, values, beliefs, behaviors and 
interactions of the Ex-Southern Pacific employees. 
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The Steps Taken by the Union Pacific  
 The Union Pacific post-merger culture change has similarities to the Pritchett & 
Pound cultural change model discussed in Chapter Two.  For example, those researchers 
suggest that for the 30% of the employees who will be anti-change that “You will be 
better off getting rid of them” (Pritchett & Pound, 2003, p. 22). Former Southern Pacific 
middle management claim that they were constantly reminded in subtle and unsubtle 
ways that they ran a bad railroad.  The Union Pacific announced its intention to lay off 
close to 3,000 workers and transfer more than 2,000 others (Saunders, 2003).  The layoffs 
and transfers began immediately.  A number of Southern Pacific middle managers took 
advantage of separation packages.  As was stated, these employees were the ones who 
knew the most about making the fragile Southern Pacific physical plant around the 
Houston area perform.  In short order, these Southern Pacific middle managers felt 
unwelcome and also left the company. “… [by] replacing SP people with UP people in 
key jobs in Houston, it imposed Union Pacific’s methods on Southern Pacific’s fickle 
terminal” (Frailey, 1998, p. 33).  In a spirit befitting an achievement orientation, Southern 
Pacific’s few remaining operating managers tried to tell the Union Pacific what would 
and would not work on their track around Houston.  The Union Pacific team, however, 
had plans of its own.  The Union Pacific attitude was that they had the resources and the 
talent and could do what they wanted since they owned the company.  Southern Pacific 
employees had their pride and left the company when the opportunity to take a separation 
package was presented (Frailey, 1998). 
 Some Southern Pacific employees with union contracts were assimilated into the 
Union Pacific with various seniority schemes (UP9, UP10).  Once there, the road crews 
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found conditions very different from what they were accustomed to.   From the 
perspective of the Union Pacific, the new employees were simply required to follow the 
same rules and procedures as the existing employees (UP11).  In the minds of the 
Southern Pacific crews, they had suffered a loss of empowerment, their skills were not 
respected and their expertise was dismissed (UP2).  One employee said that the Union 
Pacific treated train engineers as glorified truck drivers.  In his words, “ … if the 
Southern Pacific practiced it the Union Pacific would not associate itself with it”  (UP9).  
Linda Grant Niemann, an Ex-Southern Pacific brakeman gave an example of Union 
Pacific employee attitudes.  She said “Ever ride in a [shuttle vehicle] with a UP crew?  
Those guys are afraid to talk.  Afraid somebody might turn ‘em in (Niemann, 2006, p. 
42). 
Complexity of Issues 
Adding to the cultural effect of the merger is the effect of geography.  Most 
Southern Pacific operating employees continued to live and work in the territory of their 
heritage railroad – remote  from Union Pacific leadership – adding complexity to the 
acceptance and adoption of group behavior norms. Since acceptance of these common 
ways of acting have to come first (Kotter & Heskett, 1992) the adoption of any shared 
values that shape group behavior is delayed. 
The Southern Pacific employees, however, saw the post-merger culture change 
attempt as the Union Pacific micro-managing their every move and “…dumbing down 
[their] craft” (Niemann. 2006. p.46).  From a general management perspective, enforcing 
compliance to the rules and directing the activities of employees certainly is a desirable 
trait.  In this instance, though, it ignited the firestorm that resulted in the railroad 
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meltdown discussed previously. Kaufman wrote that the Union Pacific rail system “… 
suffered a service crisis of greater magnitude than anything seen in the U. S. rail industry 
since the World War I congestion.” (Kaufman, 2005, p. 318).  The Union Pacific system 
ground to a halt, causing accidents that cost lives, disrupting interstate commerce and 
costing the economy $2 billion.  The Surface Transportation Board (successor to the 
Interstate Commerce Commission) attributed the meltdown to Union Pacific’s arrogance.  
“Portending a difficult integration, UP management ordered rapid integration of the two 
lines…” (Bruner, 2005, p. 199).  Seemingly, the Union Pacific failed to recognize the 
difference in values, failed to accommodate the diversity of cultures, and tried to force 
their standards on a population of employees that were unprepared and unwilling to 
change. 
 The Pritchett and Pound Cultural Change Model has many components that 
resemble the Union Pacific approach.  For example, (1) The Union Pacific did not spend 
time with cultural analysis.  They focused on the future and put all of their energy into 
quickly making the acquisition and running the new system with practices and procedures 
that had been successful for them before the merger.  The Ranking Democrat Member of 
the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee argued that the merger of the two 
railroads created a monopoly in markets that accounted for revenues of $800 million to 
$1.5 billion each year.  The Justice Department estimated that shippers could expect a 10 
percent price increase in those markets due to the reduction of competition (Oberstar, 
1996). (2) Rather than encouraging innovation the Union Pacific established strict 
guidelines and reminded everyone of the penalties for straying from the rules (UP10). 
This change was promoted relentlessly.  (3) The Union Pacific built its power base by 
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giving their best people the big jobs (UP3).  These were people who knew the Union 
Pacific way of doing things, who exemplified the Union Pacific attitudes, and who were 
the most loyal to the company. 
 In a speech to the Newcomen Society in 2002, Dick Davidson, the Union Pacific 
Chief Executive Officer at the time, said  
“The difficulties of 1997 and ’98 amounted to the biggest service challenge in our 
 history – an 18-month period when we failed our customers, our shareholders and 
 ourselves.  None of us saw it coming until it was too late.  None of us had the 
 answers to end it quickly” (Davidson, 2002, online). 
Chapter Summary 
 The Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group and the Union Pacific Railroad took 
diverse approaches towards the management of their post-merger corporate culture.   
The culture change initiative that followed the merger of Dollar Rent A Car and Thrifty 
Car Rental was based on a transformation model that involved the identification and 
adoption of best practices from both predecessor companies.  The Union Pacific approach 
differed by being an assimilation model where the dominant Union Pacific culture 
prevailed by design forcing the Southern Pacific employees to adapt and align with their 
new parent company. 
 The years following the Dollar Thrifty merger were harmonious.  At the Union 
Pacific, however, the railroad suffered a meltdown of major proportions due to post-




Using the Harrison and Stokes (1992) identifiers, Dollar Rent A Car had a power 
culture orientation prior to the merger.  This culture was characterized by a history of 
goals achievement, waste reduction and expanded spans of control.  Their competitor, 
Thrifty Car Rental had a support culture based on mutual trust between the individual and 
the corporation.  The effect of the combination of Dollar’s task style culture with 
Thrifty’s relationship style culture concerned senior management enough to take steps to 
reduce the likelihood of a damaging clash.  The culture change initiative had three 
successful components.  (1) A new mission, core values, and guiding principles were 
conceived that represented the best of both heritage cultures.  Programs enabling the 
guiding principles were created, funded, and implemented; (2) an easily recognizable 
cultural icon was created and heavily promoted.  The icon, a live bulldog, was named 
VET which are the initials of the company’s mission: Value Every Time; (3) A company-
wide pool of cultural ambassadors was formed and trained to spread the word and act as 
role models of the new culture. 
The Union Pacific and Southern Pacific railroads have a long history of 
competition and rivalry. The business styles, modes of operation, sense of purpose and 
financial strength have differed between the companies from the beginning and shaped 
the cultures of both organizations. 
Using the Harrison and Stokes identifiers, the Southern Pacific was a railroad 
with a strong achievement type of culture.  Employees characterized the company as 
permitting self-motivation, field-level decision-making, and allowing a level innovation 
and discretion to get the job done.  Interviewed sources defined the Union Pacific, at the 
time of the 1996 merger, as a company that managed by intimidation that suffered from 
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confrontational relationships with the rank and file.  The railroad could be defined as 
having a role type culture that relies on a system of rules, structures and procedures to 
provide stability to the company and protection to the employees.  The Southern Pacific 
employees interpreted this as ruling by fear. 
The Southern Pacific and Union Pacific cultures did not mesh well.  Southern 
Pacific employees who knew how to make their frail and undercapitalized rail system 
work were discounted by Union Pacific management who felt that they could run the 
acquired railroad the same way they ran all their other lines.  Many Southern Pacific 
middle management and other key employees accepted buy-out packages or required 
relocations.  The result was a meltdown of operations that started in Houston and 
eventually delayed rail traffic across America.  Interstate commerce was affected, 
shippers lost millions of dollars in perishable cargo, the cost to the economy was about 
two billion dollars, and exhausted employees had accidents and made errors. 
The Union Pacific approach to post-merger culture change consisted primarily of 
enforcing the Southern Pacific’s adoption of their role type culture.  The Union Pacific 
case study portrays a company that fits the Kotter and Heskett (1992) description of 
having an unhealthy culture.  The case illustrates similarities between actual events and 
what was discussed in Chapter Two as the Pritchett and Pound (2003) model. 
Epilogue New Challenges Facing the Union Pacific 
The meltdown of 1997 is finally behind them.  However, the potential for another 
one looms – this time caused by different factors: staff shortages and capacity constraints. 
At a presentation in July 2006, CEO Jim Young said that the railroad is trying to 
temporarily contain demand by raising prices.  Because of attrition and retirements, the 
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railroad hired 20,000 employees in the last five years.  He told this researcher that the 
Union Pacific has to hire and train 5,000 more employees in the next twelve months to 
offset turnover and maintain velocity.  This will be a daunting task because railroad jobs 
are not traditional Monday through Friday work and that contemporary work-life values 
of young people today are contrary to the railroad’s staffing needs.  Railroad workers are 
well paid but often must work long and unpredictable hours.  Included with the expected 
turnover of personnel are a large number of managers, which presents an opportunity to 
further harmonize the culture of the organization. Interestingly, with these 5,000 
additional employees, over 50% of the Union Pacific workforce will have been hired 
following the Southern Pacific acquisition. To these employees, the great service 
meltdown culture clash of 1996 is simply a historical event and the culture clash leading 






IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH 
Structure and Purpose 
 The objectives of this chapter are: (1) to illustrate the relationship of theories 
found in the literature review to findings in the two cases; (2) to reemphasize the value of 
the post-merger culture change study by imply how the findings can assist companies 
considering a merger; (3) to concede the limitations of the study; and (4) to suggest future 
research opportunities. 
Theory/Practice Relationships 
 The different approaches, execution and results of the two cases suggest that a 
favorable outcome will be the product of management’s attention to the human side of 
mergers and acquisitions. The Dollar Thrifty approach to post-merger culture change 
appears to be rooted in McGregor’s Theory Y that assumes that it is possible to design 
organizations that have congruence between employee needs and organizational needs.  
The Union Pacific – Southern Pacific merger, dissimilarly, follows McGregor’s Theory 
X that portrays employees as intrinsically in conflict with their organization.  The Union 
Pacific is a company where top-down decision making predominates – a characteristic of 
Theory X firms.   The post-merger culture at Dollar Thrifty also has some characteristics 
of Theory Z introduced by Ouchi (1981).  Theory Z companies have flatter organizational 
structures, longer-term employment, intensive socialization and values emphasizing 
teamwork and cooperation.  Procter & Gamble, IBM and Hewlett-Packard follow Theory 
Z in their own systems.  An opposing point of view comes from Pascale & Athos (1981) 
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who referred to Theory Y reorganizations, quality circles, and team building exercises as 
“gimmickry” that do not address the real problem of “limitations to managerial culture” 
(Pascale & Athos, 1981, p.201). 
Despite the display of certain characteristics, the researched mergers are too 
complex to be reduced to a single 1980’s management theory.  For example, Dollar 
Thrifty was able to successfully combine two rival companies with unique and opposing 
cultures without disregarding their day-to-day business.  The Union Pacific, to the 
contrary, had severe organizational difficulties because it undertook a revolutionary 
change (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1999) and disregarded the value of the human capital 
from the company it acquired. 
 Using the designations made by Cartwright & Cooper in 1996, the Union Pacific 
acquisition of the Southern Pacific was a Traditional Marriage wherein the Union Pacific 
was dissatisfied with the performance of the Southern Pacific and felt that its role was to 
redesign it.  Managers and employees of the Southern Pacific suffered career-modifying 
actions when they resisted.  Using the same Cartwright & Cooper (1996) descriptors, the 
Dollar Thrifty merger was a Collaborative Marriage featuring the identification and 
implementation of best practices, synergies and shared learning from both companies. 
 Buono & Bowditch (1989) said that there are two fundamental ways of changing 
culture in an organization.  One is by “…getting organizational incumbents to reduce 
resistance to a new configuration of beliefs and values” (p. 165). The Dollar Thrifty 
results have characteristics of Lewin’s (1951) force field analysis that depicts 
organizations as having some forces that drive change and other forces that resist change.  
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When the forces for change are greater than the forces against change, as they were at 
Dollar Thrifty, inertia is overcome. 
The other fundamental way of changing culture in an organization, according to 
Buono & Bowditch (1989), is descriptive of the Union Pacific’s tactic of removing past 
members of the organization and pushing new members as necessary.  According to 
Kotter & Schlesinger (1979), this explicit and implicit coercion approach is appropriate 
when there is no time and when managers have considerable power.  The advantage is 
that it can be fast and effective in the short term with all types of resistance.  It leads, 
however, to resentment and has only short-term impact. 
 It appears that the Dollar Thrifty post-merger culture change was successful 
because the employees of both companies were communicated with and served as change 
agents (the Cultural Ambassadors).  “Culture change calls for receptiveness amongst the 
collective for new ideas, values and meanings” (Alvesson, 2002, p. 186).  The post-
merger culture change problems at the Union Pacific probably were compounded by 
uncertainties, ambiguities and stress. 
Implications to Others 
 Investopedia (2002) reported that four of the reasons often cited for contributing 
to the failure of a merger are: (1) flawed motivations; (2) unmet economies of scale; (3) 
cultural incompatibility; and (4) disregard of the core business.  As it addresses cultural 
incompatibility, this post-merger culture change research clearly develops a theme (based 
on the two cases) that companies that: communicate with their employees; develop and 
espouse a living set of core values; actively adopt best practices of both entities; and seek 
employee input and involvement have a greater likelihood of having a successful merger 
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than companies that assert their will, provide exit strategies to resistors, and fail to 
communicate with and understand the employee population.  The findings of this study 
also imply and highlight the importance of securing employee commitment before or 
immediately following the merger.  This will aid in promoting a positive shift in what 
was described as Lewin’s (1951) Force Field effect.  The post-merger culture change 
study also illustrates the importance of cultivating a people-centric culture that supports 
education, sound human resource practices, recognition and respect.  Employees who are 
part of this culture could also support management in future change efforts. 
 Consultants and managers who are planning a merger should know that there 
could be a sense of resentment and hampered productivity due to changes in values and 
management style.  The promotion of a high level of communication and employee 
involvement in the planning and execution of the merger, according to this research, will 
reduce resistance and role ambiguity. 
Limitations 
 “Limitations set some conditions that acknowledge the partial and tentative nature 
of any research” (Rossman & Rallis, 2003, p.133).  Some acknowledged limitations to 
this study are (1) this research was performed on what could be described as a 
convenience sample.  The researcher was employed by the Dollar Thrifty Automotive 
Group as a vice president during the course of his dissertation research.  Although this 
employee relationship assisted with the access to subject matter experts and other 
interview sources, it could be considered a limitation by some in terms of pure 
objectivity.  Despite being cognitive of this, the researcher’s position as an officer of the 
company may have affected the validity of responses from employees lower in the 
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organization.  Regarding the second case, the Union Pacific – Southern Pacific merger 
was chosen because of the familiarity of contacts that could help access a cross-section of 
interview respondents.  (2) there is limited generalizability to this study due to several 
variables between other companies and those studied in this research.  These included the 
size of the employee population, geographic distribution of employees, safety issues, and 
the tenure and representation of the workforce. Considering the extraordinary complexity 
of organizational combinations, different acquisitions will possibly result in different 
cultural dynamics and potential organizational outcomes. 
Proposed Future Research 
Since the Dollar Thrifty case was a friendly combination of fierce rivals while the 
Union Pacific – Southern Pacific case can be described as a hostile takeover, future 
research might be in order to identify the post-merger culture change techniques of a   
friendly combinations went awry or a hostile takeover that was successful.  Similarly, 
future research can be undertaken to identify if the structural/methodological nature of 
the combination (merger versus acquisition) affects success more than the human side. 
Another research opportunity would be to examine and compare mergers in the 
same industry.  One that is especially appealing is the recent break-up of Conrail into two 
pieces and the acquisition of one piece by the Norfolk Southern railroad and the other by 
CSX Transportation.  This study would compare the post-merger culture change 
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Figure A1.    Literature Review Model – Theories. 
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